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
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a contemporary examination of traditional public 
health objectives to address social problems not amenable to individual 
resolution. Taking the tradition a step further, it defines a “public health 
right” that may justify certain government actions that otherwise appear 
to impair individual rights. For example, lawmakers are considering 
whether current regulations on prescription drugs should be loosened to 
allow terminally ill patients to access drugs before they have been tested 
and approved for the general public. This Article concludes that 
expanding access to experimental drugs would violate the public health 
right to scientific knowledge and new drug development. The choice of a 
few patients to avail themselves of untested drugs depletes the “commons” 
of biomedical research. The Article concludes by briefly testing the public 
health right against other contemporary laws intended to promote public 
health and welfare, finding some but not all are justified. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most people, and most courts, accept that individuals have a right of 
personal autonomy and control over what is done to their bodies. The right 
is firmly rooted in common law doctrines, including the tort of battery,
1
 
self-defense privilege,
2
 and informed-consent standards,
3
 and recognized 
in constitutional rights to refuse medical treatment
4
 and obtain an 
abortion.
5
 At the same time, most people and most courts accept that 
individual rights may have to yield, at times, to the greater good of 
society.
6
 For example, most states have well-established mandatory 
vaccination laws to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
7
 Most states 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955); Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 
(Wis. 1891). Even a slight touching, without harm, may constitute a battery. See Mahaise v. United 
States, 722 A.2d 29, 30 (D.C. 1998). 
 2. See, e.g., People v. Pignatoro, 136 N.Y.S. 155, 160 (Magis. Ct. 1911) (describing self-
defense as ―an inherent right of man, older than states or Constitutions‖); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 
P. 284 (Colo. 1896); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962). 
 3. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schloendorff v. Soc‘y of 
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.) (―Every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .‖). 
 4. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep‘t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing 14th Amendment 
liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment). 
 5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 6. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 
1422–23 (2004) (asserting that ―[m]ost people start with the naive assumption that when matters of 
public health are on the table, claims for individual liberty normally must give way,‖ but defending 
―traditional‖ role of public health in ―containing epidemics, contagion, and nuisances, which . . . do 
not lend themselves effectively to either market solutions or private actions in tort‖). 
 7. Modern mandatory vaccination laws are usually imposed as conditions of public school 
attendance. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–32 (1905) (―And the principle of 
vaccination as a means to prevent the spread of smallpox has been enforced in many States by statutes 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
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also have long required individuals to wear seat belts and motorcycle 
helmets, despite these types of laws‘ intrusions on liberty interests—such 
as not being pricked with a needle or traveling in one‘s personal vehicle 
unencumbered by straps and buckles.
8
 Although not without controversy, 
many states and localities prohibit smoking in public places.
9
 Such laws 
have been repeatedly justified and upheld in the interest of public health.
10
 
But would most people, or most courts, as readily agree that 
individuals should be prohibited from ingesting certain substances into 
their bodies, selling substances to desirous consumers, restricted in 
handgun ownership, or required to buy health insurance in the interest of 
public health? Recent cases and policy debates raise those challenging 
questions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
recently declined to recognize an individual right to take experimental 
 
 
making the vaccination of children a condition of their right to enter or remain in public schools.‖) 
(citing cases); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (excluding from the public schools or other places 
of education children or other persons not having a certificate of vaccination); PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
AND ETHICS: A READER 379 & 380 tbl.6 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 2002) (noting that ―[a]ll states, as a 
condition of school entry, require proof of vaccination against a number of diseases on the 
immunization schedule‖ and cataloguing state laws); Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, 
Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE 262, 269–70 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003) (tracing history of laws and 
noting that as of 1981, all fifty states had school vaccination laws, with all but four states requiring 
vaccination for all primary and secondary grades by 1999). 
 8. See, e.g., Linda Geller Dubinsky, The Minnesota Mandatory Seat Belt Law: No Right to Be 
Reckless?, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 229, 229 (1987); Anthony P. Polito, Constitutional Law: Seatbelt 
Laws and the Right to Privacy, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 752, 757 (1987) (describing debate 
between right to be free from government intrusion and government interest in preventing injuries); 
Kenneth M. Royalty, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 
OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1969); Jeffery L. Thomas, Freedom to Be Foolish? L.B. 496: The Mandatory 
Seatbelt Law, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 743 (1986). 
 9. See, e.g., Jean C. O‘Connor et al., Preemption of Local Smoke-Free Air Ordinances: The 
Implications of Judicial Opinions for Meeting National Health Objectives, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
403, 403 (2008) (noting ongoing challenges to tobacco-related public health concerns, but, as of 2007, 
all but sixteen states adopted some form of law regulating indoor smoking); see generally James R. 
Davis & Ross C. Brownson, A Policy for Clean Indoor Air in Missouri: History and Lessons Learned, 
13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 749 (1994) (describing clean indoor air debate); Action on Smoking and 
Health, State Smokefree Air Laws At-A-Glance, http://www.ash.org/smokingbans.html (last visited 
May 9, 2009) (listing states and types of bans). But cf. German Court Rejects Smoking Bans, BBC 
NEWS, July 30, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7533132.stm (responding to 
challenge by bar owners). 
 10. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-702(a) (2008) (mandatory seat belt law); D.C. CODE 
§ 50-1802(a) (2001) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-11.6(a)(1) (2006) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
135.2A(a) (2007) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 12-417A (2007) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-
6520 (2006) (same); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27 (―[A] community has the right to protect itself against 
an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.‖); Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 
1519 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding Florida‘s motorcycle helmet law); Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 
757 (Vt. 1994) (noting that most states rejected challenges to helmet laws, listing cases). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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drugs.
11
 One state and several localities have prohibited restaurants from 
selling certain foods believed to cause obesity.
12
 Last term, four United 
States Supreme Court Justices and several commentators argued in support 
of handgun restrictions, partially on public health grounds.
13
 In addition, 
state policy makers and U.S. presidential candidates propose to address the 
problem of health insurance coverage by requiring individuals to purchase 
health insurance.
14
 Those examples suggest the emergence, or 
 
 
 11. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 12. See Charisse Jones & Nanci Hellmich, NYC Bans Trans Fats in Restaurants; Landmark 
Rules Take Effect July 1, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2006, at 1A; For Your Own Good, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
2008, at WK2 (noting California‘s new law, among others); Jennifer Steinhauer, California Bars 
Restaurant Use of Trans Fats, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at A1. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, Cardiovascular Disease Prevention: Healthy Heart—Avoid Trans Fat, http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/doh/html/cardio/cardio-transfat.shtml (last visited May 9, 2009) (announcing final trans fat 
regulation and providing links to Health Code amendments). 
 13. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2854–61 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that, ―[n]o one doubts the constitutional importance of the statute‘s basic objective, saving 
lives,‖ and evaluating evidence from public health authorities, pediatricians, and other experts on 
violence prevention); Brief for the American Public Health Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 3, 21, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290) (―Firearms have a profound 
effect on the public‘s health in the United States. . . . In this context, the District of Columbia‘s 
decision to focus its firearms regulations on handguns makes public health sense.‖); Brief of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 
2783 (No. 07-290) (―Handgun-related injuries and fatalities to children are significant public health 
problems in terms of both impact on children‘s physical and mental health, and impact on the cost to 
the public health system.‖); Jeffery M. Drazen et al., Guns and Health, NEW ENG. J. MED. 517, 517–18 
(2008) (citing medical literature demonstrating that closer regulation of guns promotes public health 
by reducing suicide and homicide, and describing Heller: ―The Supreme Court has launched the 
country on a risky epidemiologic experiment.‖); see also Mark Tushnet, Interpreting the Right to Bear 
Arms: Gun Regulation and Constitutional Law, 10 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1424, 1425 (2008) (suggesting 
that case is ―too close to call‖ but that the ―gun-control side has a slightly better argument‖). 
 14. See, e.g., Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act of 2006, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, 
§ 2(a) (2006) (requirement that all residents over age 18 maintain a minimum level of health 
insurance); Sonya Geis & Christopher Lee, Schwarzenegger Proposes Universal Health Coverage, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2007, at A3 (describing proposed California reforms, including individual health 
insurance mandate). Barack Obama‘s ―Plan for a Healthy America‖ provides that ―Obama will require 
that all children have health care coverage.‖ BARACK OBAMA‘S PLAN FOR A HEALTHY AMERICA, 
available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/HealthPlanFull.pdf (last visited May 9, 2009); see also 
Walter Shapiro, The Quest for Universal Healthcare, SALON.COM, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.salon. 
com/news/feature/2008/02/21/healthcare/index.html (Hillary Clinton‘s plan required individuals ―to 
get and keep insurance in a system where insurance is affordable and accessible‖); Michael Luo, On 
Health Care, Affordability and Comprehensiveness, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 22, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/02/22/us/politics/22check.html (quoting Sen. Obama: ―Senator Clinton 
believes the only way to achieve universal health care is to force everybody to purchase it‖); Kevin 
Sack, Comparing the Democratic Candidates‟ Health Care Plans, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 22, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/world/americas/22iht-23health.10317717. 
html?_r=1 (describing Clinton‘s view that the only way to achieve universal health coverage is to 
require everyone to have it); Editorial, Health Care; No Miracle Cures, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Aug. 3, 2008, at C4 (―[Obama‘s] plan could flop because it lacks a mandate that the uninsured actually 
purchase those newly affordable health plans.‖). But cf. Richard E. Ralston, Mandatory Health 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
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reemergence, of a ―public health right‖ that trumps otherwise strongly 
protected individual liberty, autonomy, privacy, and property rights. 
This Article offers a contemporary view on the ―public health right‖ 
and its relevance in recent policy debates. The public health right defended 
herein is conspicuously distinct from the ―right to health,‖ meaning an 
affirmative individual right to health or health care.
15
 Neither does the 
public health right derive from the so-called new public health, which 
extends government intervention into a wide range of private choices and 
concerns.
16
 Rather, the public health right is grounded in the core mission 
of public health to reduce ―public bads‖ and protect ―public goods.‖17 The 
concept is also distinct from notions of the commonweal or common good, 
 
 
Insurance: Health Care By Force, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, July 30, 2006, http://www.capmag.com/ 
article.asp?ID=4753; Glen Whitman, Hazards of the Individual Health Care Mandate, CATO POLICY 
REPORT, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v29n5/cpr29n5.pdf 
(criticizing individual mandate). 
 15. The concept of an affirmative right to health, health care, or a healthy environment is often 
tied to international human rights aspirational standards. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Recognition of the 
International Human Right to Health and Health Care in the United States, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 
353–56, 363–64 (2008) (discussing ―right to health‖ under Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and other international declarations, as well as U.S. Constitution and state laws); Benjamin Mason 
Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard: Advancing a Collective Human Right to 
Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 112–15, 121–24 (2005) (distinguishing ―health‖ 
and ―public health‖ rights); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Governing Health, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 43, 43–44 
(2008) (supporting ―right to health and health care‖ as ―ethical demand,‖ realized through ―public 
moral norms‖ in context of Abigail Alliance decision); George P. Smith, II, Human Rights and 
Bioethics: Formulating a Universal Right to Health, Health Care, or Health Protection?, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 1295, 1313–17, 1319 (2005) (defining ―right to health, health care, or health 
protection‖ in the global context); see also Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right 
to Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 65 (2008); Alan Jenkins & Sabrineh Ardalan, Positive Health: 
The Human Right to Health Care Under the New York State Constitution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 479 
(2008). 
 16. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1423 (distinguishing ―old‖ and ―new‖ public health and listing 
examples of inspection, quarantine, and vaccination for the former, and tort reform, access to health 
care, and relieving wealth disparity for the latter); see, e.g., THEODORE H. TULCHINKSKY & ELENA A. 
VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH 107–09 (2000) (citing World Health Organization definition 
of the ―New Public Health (NPH)‖ as ―[A] philosophy which endeavors to broaden the older 
understanding of public health so that, for example, it includes the health of the individual in addition 
to the health of populations, and seeks to address such contemporary health issues as are concerned 
with equitable access to health services, the environment, political governance and social and 
economic development.‖); Lawrence O. Gostin & M. Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A 
Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S160, S162, S172 (2003) (responding to Epstein‘s 
and other conservatives‘ attacks on public health but agreeing that ―there is a ‗new‘ public health, 
broader in its reach than . . . control of infectious disease‖); Meier & Mori, supra note 15, at 119 
(―[M]odern public health programs can be framed expansively as part of a social justice movement 
. . . .‖); id. at 129 (―[T]he new public health considers that both disease and society are so 
interconnected that both must be considered dynamic.‖) (quoting Jonathan M. Mann). 
 17. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (1971); R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (defining 
public goods as non-exclusive, non-excludable goods, such as a lighthouse beacon). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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whereby protecting the rights of many may justify intruding on the rights 
of one or a few.
18
 The simple utilitarian calculus of saving several by 
killing one fails to provide a satisfying justification for the public health 
right.
19
 Rather, this Article urges that the public, as a body (the ―body 
politic‖) has a right to government protection and promotion.20 The 
discussion begins by framing public health and individual rights in 
historical context, focusing on the traditional core functions of public 
health, such as sanitation and vaccination.  
To develop the modern public health right in context, this Article 
examines the asserted right to experimental treatment. At least one court
21
 
and numerous commentators staunchly defended the fundamental, 
constitutional right of terminally ill patients to access experimental drugs 
that have not yet received regulatory approval as a right of medical self-
defense,
22
 right to make treatment decisions,
23
 or right to life.
24
 The last 
judicial word on that question concluded that no such fundamental right 
exists. This Article supports the court‘s final decision but offers the public 
health right as a stronger, ultimately more satisfying, rationale for the 
conclusion. This Article concludes with a general defense of a public 
health right and considers its application into other contemporary contexts. 
 
 
 18. See Philip Cole, The Moral Bases for Public Health Interventions, 6 EPIDEMIOLOGY 78, 81 
(1995) (discussing ―commonweal‖ rationale for public health, which ―lies in the reality that the 
protection of the rights of a larger number of people sometimes requires the abrogation of the rights of 
a smaller number‖). 
 19. See, e.g., R v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (holding defendants liable for 
murdering one cast-away, rejecting claim that it was necessary to save three others). 
 20. See Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public Health, 15 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 29 (1985) (―[T]he ‗body politic‘ or the ‗commonwealth‘ as it was termed 
in the early days of the American Republic [referred to the public‘s] interest, held in common, in self-
protection or preservation from threats of all kinds to their welfare.‖); see also Nancy M. Baum et al., 
Looking Ahead: Addressing Ethical Challenges in Public Health Practice, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 657, 
658–59 (2007) (distinguishing ―public health from individually oriented health care‖ and urging that 
―inadequacy of an autonomy-focused approach . . . suggest[s] that public health ethics is a field of 
inquiry in its own right‖); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1427 (quoting the Latin maxim, ―[t]he well being 
of the public is the supreme law,‖ as having ―powerful roots even in the American political tradition‖). 
 21. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 22. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for 
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007). 
 23. B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two 
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 313–14 (2008). 
 24. Randy E. Barnett, In Re: Life or Death, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2006, at A9 (discussing pending 
en banc review and asserting: ―At stake is the right to life.‖); Steven Walker, A Different “Right to 
Life,” WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008, at A10 (cofounder of the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs on pending petition for certiorari). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
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II. BACKGROUND 
Before defining the modern public health right, it is helpful first to 
understand the tradition of public health and justifications for government 
action that may impair individual rights. This Part begins with an 
exposition on the ―old‖ public health, and then describes various ethical 
justifications for government intrusions on individual rights. This 
background frames the discussion that follows.
25
 
A. Public Health Objectives 
The Institute of Medicine articulated a classic conception of public 
health: ―Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the 
conditions for people to be healthy.‖26 As that definition suggests, public 
health goals typically cannot be achieved through individual action, but 
require collective, coordinated interventions.
27
 Often, that ―we,‖ the 
organizer of public health efforts, is the government.
28
 In addition, the 
benefits accrue to the people—the community, the body politic, the public. 
―The government‘s concern . . . is not . . . for this or that individual but . . . 
for all individuals[,] . . . the welfare of the community.‖29 Collective action 
and public benefit are hallmarks of public health interventions.  
 
 
 25. See infra Part IV (making case for ―public health right‖). 
 26. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE 
FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988); see also PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, supra 
note 7, at 2 (quoting same); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 
180 (1982) (―[P]ublic health [is] ‗the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and 
promoting physical health and efficiency through organized community efforts . . . and the 
development of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the community a 
standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health.‘‖) (quoting Yale professor of public health 
in 1920). 
 27. See MICHAEL WALZER, Security and Welfare, in SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, supra 
note 7, at 69, 75 (―Dealing with tuberculosis, cancer, or heart failure, however, requires a common 
effort. Medical research is expensive, and the treatment of many particular diseases lies far beyond the 
resources of ordinary citizens. So the community must step in . . . .‖). 
 28. Id. (identifying ―the role of the American government (or governments, for much of the 
activity is at the state and local levels)‖ in various public health interventions); see also Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (regarding state powers to enact ―[i]nspection laws, 
quarantine laws, health laws of every description‖). 
 29. Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 29 (quoting JOSEPH TUSSMAN, OBLIGATIONS AND THE BODY 
POLITIC 27–28 (1996)) (alteration and emphasis omitted); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and 
the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 267, 278–81 (1993) (describing role of government in public health). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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For example, think of city sanitation
30
: I alone, or even with my 
neighbors, may decide to refrain from tossing our garbage, kitchen scraps, 
and human waste in the streets. That noble effort may make our immediate 
environment more pleasant and sanitary, but it does nothing to stop the 
flow of filth into our gutters, streams, and drinking water from other 
residents and businesses up the street and across town.
31
 Despite our 
neighborhood efforts, we nevertheless may be exposed to unsightly, 
unpleasant, and disease-carrying sewage. We might try to spread the 
gospel of clean streets beyond our neighborhood through word of mouth, 
flyers, or billboards, or even try to pay others to stop dumping, if it is 
important enough to us. But those are logistically and monetarily difficult 
propositions. Even if we could identify all of the polluters, the transaction 
costs of negotiating with each individually would be staggering. The 
payment option, in particular, risks the hold-out problem of the last few 
people in town demanding inordinate sums to give up their individual 
trash-dumping rights.
32
 
Moreover, even those who voluntarily agree to join our effort may 
lapse or otherwise decide to return to dumping their garbage in the gutters. 
We, as individuals or in small groups, are powerless to bring the violators 
back into compliance, save sanctions such as withholding any agreed 
payments, shaming, boycotts, or the like.
33
 Even if the law assigns us the 
 
 
 30. Sanitation was one of the earliest public health objectives. See STARR, supra note 26, at 181 
(―In mid-nineteenth-century America, public health was mainly concerned with sanitary reform and 
affiliated more closely with engineering than with medicine.‖); Elizabeth Fee, The Origins and 
Development of Public Health in the United States, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH: THE 
SCOPE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Roger Detels et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
AND ETHICS: A READER, supra note 7, at 27, 28 (―In the colonies, public health consisted of activities 
deemed necessary to protect the population from the spread of epidemic diseases, by the enactment of 
sanitary laws and regulations governing such matters as the construction of toilets, the disposal of 
wastes, and the disposition of dead animals.‖); Parmet, supra note 29, at 290 (noting that ―public 
sanitation regulations in Massachusetts go back as far as 1634‖). 
 31. This discussion presumes that my neighbors and I do not live in isolation but as part of a 
community. The stated problem is city sanitation, thereby assuming a densely populated, organized 
environment. In isolation, a single individual could perhaps maintain optimal sanitary enjoyment 
without the neighborhood effects of others‘ conduct. See Lemuel Shattuck, Introduction and Private 
Rights and Liberties, in REPORT OF THE SANITARY COMMISSION OF MASSACHUSETTS (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1948) (1850), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, supra note 7, at 25; cf. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 270 (7th ed. 2007) (noting that ―[n]eighborliness 
and other forms of selflessness reduce external costs and increase external benefits,‖ hence 
―externalities‖ are sometimes called ―neighborhood effects‖). The problem of public health applies to 
societies, not individuals living alone in the state of nature. 
 32. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that ―people owning land in the path of the 
advancing line will be tempted to hold out for a very high price‖); id. at 72–72 (describing holdouts 
and problems of incompatible land use). 
 33. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 127, 
213–19 (1991) (listing gradual escalation of sanctions against social norms violators); Robert D. 
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initial right to be free from pollution, instead of a right to pollute, we face 
practical obstacles to enforcing our right. With thousands of potential 
polluter-defendants, whom should we sue and for how much? Could we 
convincingly prove who caused what harm to whom and that it was not an 
act of God? Can we track down the polluters and, once we do, will they 
have the means to compensate our harm?
34
 
Thus, the goal of clean, sanitary streets necessitates collective action, 
along with a central enforcement mechanism (i.e., government). Similar 
analysis could apply to any number of other societal objectives, such as 
preventing spread of contagious diseases, protecting clean air and water, 
promoting temperance and reducing violence, ending child labor and 
ensuring workplace safety, and defending against terrorist attack.
35
 
Individually, one person cannot achieve those broad aims, even if she gets 
vaccinated, stops drinking, refuses to hire minors, limits use of her car, 
and builds a bomb shelter in her backyard. But government, by 
implementing and enforcing laws, can bring about collective action and 
societal benefit.
36
 
At the same time, public health cannot achieve those goals ―without, 
sooner or later, violating private beliefs or private property or the 
prerogatives of other institutions,‖ including religious groups, business 
interests, medical professionals, and others.
37
 Having clean streets means 
 
 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New 
Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1668–69 (1996) (describing informal sanctions); Dan M. 
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631–49 (1996) (listing and 
discussing various shaming penalties); Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and 
Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 370–72 (1999). 
 34. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1443–45 (arguing similarly regarding control of communicable 
disease, that ―massive breakdown in both the theory and practice of private rights makes public 
remedies instantly attractive‖); Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: 
Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 741, 749 (2005) (―Private 
injunctions . . . falter when pollution from multiple sources damages many separate individuals. At this 
point the sensible approach has the state intervene as the agent for the aggrieved parties.‖). 
 35. See Baum et al., supra note 20, at 658–59 (―Communally shared health goals, such as herd 
immunity gained through mass vaccination, clean water, or protection from bioterrorist threats, are 
more than simply the aggregation of individual health goals: they are goods held in common.‖); 
Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 32 (articulating public health justification for temperance movement, 
beyond paternalistic protection of drinkers themselves, based on concerns that saloons ―were often 
dirty and rowdy drinking halls that exploited the working class and the poor‖); id. at 35 (suggesting 
public health justification for regulating steel, coal, alcohol, and cigarette industries). 
 36. See Parmet, supra note 29, at 335 (discussing U.S. constitutional law as illuminating ―the 
very reasons for having governments and law: to care for and protect each other, as best we can‖); 
James A. Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 126 (1927) (suggesting 
that government is ―organized for the express purpose, among others, of conserving the public 
health‖). 
 37. STARR, supra note 26, at 180–81 (listing business, religious, and other sources of opposition 
to public health efforts); see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (―[I]n every well-
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that I cannot dump my trash wherever I wish.
38
 Clean air may require 
minimizing vehicle and industrial emissions by altering driving habits or 
installing emission-control devices. Avoiding contagious disease may 
mean having inoculations that are painful and risky. Safe workplace 
standards like minimum age and wage and maximum hours laws cost 
businesses money. The government, through courts, regulators, 
prosecutors, and lawmakers, serves as referee of these conflicts among 
members of society. In public health, the conflict is often not simply one 
individual versus another, but individual interests versus the public or 
common good.
39
 
B. Public Health and Individual Rights 
Individual rights seem inherently at odds with the collective, 
population-based perspective central to public health. ―Health care‖ 
focuses on individual wellness or freedom from pathology, while ―public 
health‖ is concerned with promoting optimal health of the population as a 
whole.
40
 Public health seeks not merely the aggregation of individual 
 
 
ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the 
individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to 
such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may 
demand.‖); Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 30 (―It is the private sphere that is problematic for public 
health. Public health sometimes intrudes into this private sphere in the interest of the health and safety 
of the community.‖). 
 38. See Shattuck, supra note 31, at 25 (―It may be said, ‗Sanitary measures will interfere with 
private matters. If a child is born, if a marriage takes place, or if a person dies . . . what business is it to 
the public? . . . . ―Men who object and reason in this manner have very inadequate conceptions of the 
obligations they owe to themselves or to others.‖) (alteration omitted).  
 39. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 29 (―Public health and safety are community or 
group interests . . . that can transcend and take priority over private interests if the legislature so 
chooses.‖). 
 40. See Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health: Population-Level Measures in a Politics 
of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1607, 1608 (1997) (defining ―health‖ as a ―personal, 
medical matter, a state of freedom from pathology achieved by an individual through the mediation of 
a doctor‖ and characterizing ―[p]ublic health, by contrast . . . as an attribute of communities in social 
and physical environments‖); Andrew W. Siegel, The Jurisprudence of Public Health: Reflections on 
Lawrence O. Gostin‟s Public Health Law, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 359, 361–62 (2001) 
(quoting LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 15 (2000) (―Public 
health law is concerned with the state‘s role in advancing the health of the community, whereas health 
care law is concerned with the ‗microrelationships between health care providers and patients.‘‖). 
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satisfaction but, rather, the common good.
41
 Accordingly, individual rights 
are constantly in tension with communitarian interests.
42
 
For example, Garrett Hardin‘s classic essay The Tragedy of the 
Commons describes the challenges of respecting individual interests while 
promoting social good.
43
 In a ranch community with a common pasture, 
the interest of each cattle owner individually is to add cattle to the 
commons to increase his or her individual productivity. As the commons 
become more crowded, the yield of each animal decreases, requiring 
ranchers to add more cattle to produce the same level of individual benefit, 
and so the cycle continues. Eventually the commons is depleted and can be 
protected only through external controls, by restricting individual rights in 
favor of the collective good.
44
 
This tension underlies many public health interventions. For example, 
an individual may prefer not to be vaccinated based on religious, 
philosophical, or personal objections, even if utterly irrational, or to avoid 
medical risks, even if infinitesimally small, associated with the vaccine.
45
 
Rights of individual autonomy, dignity, and bodily integrity would seem 
to allow an individual to refuse vaccination for even foolish reasons or 
slight probabilities. But one individual‘s decision, and all who follow his 
lead, depletes the ―commons‖ of a disease-free society by increasing the 
number of unprotected people in the population.
46
 The recent trend of 
parents opting out of mandatory vaccination for their children—sometimes 
for health or religious grounds, sometimes just for convenience—
 
 
 41. Lawrence O. Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 509, 
510 (2004) (―The field of public health would profit from a vibrant conception of ‗the common‘ that 
sees public interests as more than the aggregation of individual interests.‖); Baum et al., supra note 20, 
at 657 (noting ―public health‘s emphasis on population health rather than issues of individual health‖). 
 42. But see Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health and Constitutional Law: Recognizing the 
Relationship 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL‘Y 13, 24 (2007) (―[T]he lessons for constitutional law are 
not necessarily that individual rights need to be overridden in the name of public health, or that 
individuals stand in opposition to public health, but that respect for individual rights may, at least at 
times, be a necessary prerequisite for improving public health . . . .‖); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1422 
(noting popular attitude that public health requires compromising individual rights). 
 43. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968); see also Malone 
& Hinman, supra note 7, at 262–63 (describing Hardin‘s essay); cf. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking 
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–5 
(describing the environment as a commons problem). 
 44. Hardin, supra note 43, at 1245; see also Malone & Hinman, supra note 7, at 263. 
 45. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (affirming prosecution for refusing 
vaccination, with no evidence of health contraindication or other justification); Malone & Hinman, 
supra note 7, at 273–74 (describing exemptions, including health risks, recognized in all states, and 
religious and philosophical objections, recognized in many states). 
 46. See Malone & Hinman, supra note 7, at 263 (―As more and more individuals choose to do 
what is in their ‗best‘ individual interest, the common eventually fails as herd immunity disappears and 
disease outbreaks occur.‖). 
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demonstrates the accuracy of the ―tragedy of the commons‖ model. 
Infection rates of diseases like polio, measles, mumps, and whopping 
cough that were virtually eradicated have reappeared in some 
communities.
47
  
The ―commons‖ rationale for mandatory vaccination depends on the 
scientific understanding that no vaccine is one hundred percent effective 
and that diseases, even if eradicated, can later mutate and reemerge.
48
 For 
example, tuberculosis, nearly eradicated a generation ago, recently 
reemerged with new, more resistant strains.
49
 Therefore, even those who 
become vaccinated remain at risk. If the science were otherwise—that is, 
if vaccination provided one hundred percent protection—then we might 
leave the matter to individual choice.
50
 My neighbors and I might decide 
that good chances of avoiding the disease by being vaccinated far 
outweigh the small risk of harm from the vaccine itself. Other, risk-
preferring members of society might opt to avoid vaccination and risk 
getting the disease. As long as the risk-preferrers endanger only 
themselves, there does not seem to be a public interest in requiring 
vaccination. Similarly, if I choose to wear sunscreen to reduce the risk of 
skin cancer, the fact that others prefer not to wear sunscreen in no way 
increases my risk of sunburn and cancer. Likewise, my neighbor‘s junk-
food diet does not increase my risk of heart disease. Skin cancer and 
obesity, however, are not analogous to infectious disease. The risk of 
contracting infectious disease cannot be controlled by individual choice. It 
 
 
 47. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., When Parents Say No to Child Vaccinations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 2002, at A1; Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements: 
Secular Trends and Association of State Policies with Pertussis Incidence, 296 JAMA 1757, 1757 
(2006); Jennifer Steinhauer, Rising Public Health Risk Seen as More Parents Reject Vaccines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at A1. 
 48. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 32 n.1 (discussing history and effectiveness of smallpox 
vaccination, noting rates of infection considerably lower in vaccinated population); Malone & 
Hinman, supra note 7, at 263; see also Ben Kleifgen, Vaccination Requirements and Exemptions, 
Univ. of Penn. Center for Bioethics, http://www.vaccineethics.org/issue_briefs/requirements.php (last 
visited May 9, 2009). 
 49. See Thomas R. Frieden et al., The Emergence of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis in New York 
City, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 521, 521 (1993); John D.H. Porter & Keith P.W.J. McAdam, The Re-
Emergence of Tuberculosis, 15 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 303 (1994); John M. Watson, Tuberculosis in 
Britain Today: Notifications Are No Longer Falling, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 221 (1993). 
 50. See Cole, supra note 18, at 81 (―It is difficult to find a moral basis for compelling adults to be 
immunized [if] the only person to endure the consequences of denying himself an immunization is the 
individual himself.‖); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1453–54 (suggesting that if ―individuals could obtain 
absolute immunity from smallpox by taking the vaccine themselves,‖ government action would not be 
justified, but acknowledging Jacobson Court‘s conclusion that smallpox vaccine ―was less than 
perfect‖). 
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is a nonexcludable, nonexclusive ―public bad‖ that cannot be spread upon 
some without being spread on all.
51
 
Public health is grounded in the social contract whereby individuals 
leave the state of nature in order to join society.
52
 Joining society means 
giving up certain individual rights in the interest of the greater good. In 
exchange for giving up those rights, individuals gain protection of social 
order and laws, considered superior to the state of nature.
53
 For example, 
the law of battery protects the individual right to be free from offensive or 
nonconsensual touching, even if the touching might benefit the individual 
herself or society at large.
54
 There are, however, limits on liberty or bodily 
integrity rights.
55
 The seminal case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts held that 
the state‘s interest in providing sanitation and other public health measures 
operates as a limit on individual rights consistent with the social contract.
56
 
Under the social contract, potential polluters may decide that the 
benefits gained from joining society outweigh the freedom to toss their 
trash where they like. At the same time, my neighbors and I, who have 
also given up other liberties to enter society, may have an easier time 
achieving a pollution-free environment because laws protect our interests 
and ability to obtain enforceable contracts and judgments. Whether the 
initial ―right‖ is assigned to the clean-street proponents or the polluters, we 
can either sue to enforce our right or contract to reassign it.
57
 Laws provide 
 
 
 51. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1426 (listing communicable disease and pollution as ―public 
bads‖ and distinguishing ―obesity and genetic disease‖). 
 52. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8–9 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil 
Blackwell 3d ed. reprint 1976) (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN 112 (Bernard Gert ed., 
Charles T. Wood et al. trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1991) (1651); Parmet, supra note 29, at 308–11 
(discussing social contract theory‘s relevance to Constitution‘s framing and public health).  
 53. LOCKE, supra note 52, at 8–10; HOBBES, supra note 52, at 112. 
 54. See O‘Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891) (recognizing potential 
battery for vaccination but holding that plaintiff objectively manifested consent by holding out arm to 
doctor). 
 55. See Malone & Hinman, supra note 7, at 271–73 (discussing Jacobson and the constitutional 
basis for mandatory vaccination laws); Parmet, supra note 42, at 23 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11, 26, 39 (1905)). 
 56. Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11. As the Court noted: 
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may 
be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, 
good order and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not 
unrestricted license to act according to one‘s own will. 
Id. at 26–27 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)). The Court also recognized ―the 
social compact‖ in the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 27. 
 57. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (postulating that 
despite initial assignment of legal rights, parties will freely bargain for the most productive use, based 
on relative values assigned to competing uses); see also POSNER, supra note 31, at 7, 50–53 (defining 
Coase Theorem). 
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security and protection from wanton polluters and reinforce our loyalty to 
the society we have joined. 
Public health interventions, especially safety regulations such as helmet 
and seat belt laws, seem starkly at odds with individual interests.
58
 One 
justification for those laws is paternalism: protecting people from their 
own bad judgment and requiring them to protect themselves, despite their 
free will to disregard their own safety.
59
 Safety regulations also purport to 
benefit society in a utilitarian sense by mitigating the extent of injuries 
resulting from inevitable accidents.
60
 The lost productivity and medical 
expenses associated with avoidable injuries impose costs on the rest of 
society.
61
 This ―conserving common resources‖ rationale for public health 
regulations depends on the presumption that society will provide for the 
injured person through government welfare programs or the private health 
care system.
62
 Otherwise, there would be no public harm resulting from 
one person‘s choice not to wear safety devices (or sunscreen). 
Other antilibertarian laws, such as criminal prohibitions on prostitution 
or illicit drugs, paternalistically protect individuals from engaging in 
unsafe conduct, express moral condemnation, and aim to reduce 
 
 
 58. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John 
Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (―[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized society, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.‖); Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 29 (―In one 
version of democratic theory, the state has no legitimate role in restricting personal conduct that is 
substantially voluntary and that has little or no direct consequence for anyone other than the 
individual.‖) (attributing to John Stuart Mill); Cole, supra note 18, at 80–81 (―[P]aternalism is immoral 
as a basis for attempting to dictate the behavior of a competent adult.‖). 
 59. See Stephen P. Teret & Tom Christoffel, Injury Prevention and the Law, reprinted in LAW IN 
PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 403 (noting ―bitter debate over the propriety of 
[mandatory motorcycle helmet] laws [, which] are condemned by some as paternalistic deprivations of 
highly valued personal freedoms‖). 
 60. See supra notes 8, 10 and accompanying text (citing cases and commentary on mandatory 
motorcycle and seatbelt laws). 
 61. See John Leland, The Superstar Athlete Is Paid to Take Risks, Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 
2006, at 3 (commenting on the motorcycle crash of Pittsburgh Steelers quarterback Ben 
Roethlisberger, riding without a helmet, and noting that ―[p]olicy debates over seatbelt laws, 
cigarettes, gun locks, steroids, environmental safeguards, employee savings plans and storm 
evacuation orders‖ arise from the fact that ―society—or a football team—has an interest in managing 
risk, trying to maximize individual liberty while minimizing the harm to others when one person‘s 
gamble doesn‘t pay off‖). 
 62. See Cole, supra note 18, at 81 (―[The] ‗common resources‘ [rationale] . . . is gaining 
popularity in the USA. The reasoning behind this justification is that there is a pool of common 
resources (usually money) held by the government to meet claims that may be made by individuals.‖); 
Epstein, supra note 6, at 1463 (―[T]he major argument for extensive regulation of individual health 
practices comes from the government‘s role as the insurer of (first and) last resort . . . .‖); Gostin, 
supra note 41, at 510 (―Laws designed to promote the common good may sometimes constrain 
individual actions (smoking in public places, riding a motorcycle without a helmet, etc.).‖). 
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―neighborhood effects.‖63 But those laws, like safety regulations, restrict 
individual freedom to engage in certain professions or activities. Recent 
―new‖ public health measures, such as New York City‘s and California‘s 
restaurant bans on trans fats,
64
 might be justified on paternalistic or 
―conserving common resources‖ grounds. Government may seek to 
protect people from becoming obese due to their own bad food choices by 
simply making bad foods unavailable. On different ground, government 
may seek to ensure that people do not become obese and incur greater 
health-care costs, which ultimately fall on society.
65
 But those laws are 
difficult to square with traditional public health objectives. 
III. PUBLIC HEALTH AND EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT 
Do terminally ill patients who have exhausted all other available, 
government-approved treatment options have a constitutional right to 
experimental treatment that may prolong their lives? On May 2, 2006, a 
divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in 
a startling opinion, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs v. Eschenbach, held that they do.
66
 The plaintiffs, Abigail Alliance 
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (―Abigail Alliance‖) and 
Washington Legal Foundation, sought to enjoin the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) from refusing to allow the sale of investigational 
new drugs.
67
 The terminally ill plaintiffs contended that they quite literally 
could not wait for the drugs.
68
 With no other treatment options available, 
the plaintiffs asserted a fundamental right to take potentially life-saving or 
life-prolonging drugs, even though the drugs could not be legally marketed 
to the public.
69
 The plaintiffs framed the issue as a substantive due process 
to right ―to decide, without FDA interference, whether to assume the risks 
of using potentially life-saving investigational new drugs.‖70 
 
 
 63. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 30–34 (1962) (offering rationale for 
paternalistic laws). 
 64. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (regarding New York City and California trans fats 
bans). 
 65. See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1645, 1649–52 (2004) (describing ―hidden costs‖ of obesity, including government health care 
program costs, private insurance premiums, lost productivity, more sick time for companies, and 
negative stereotypes, concluding: ―In short, the Supersizing of America hurts us all.‖). 
 66. 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 67. Id. at 471–72. 
 68. Id. at 474 (illustrating allegation in complaint with examples of four deaths of terminally ill 
patients). 
 69. Id. (describing plaintiffs‘ complaint). 
 70. Id. at 472; see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep‘t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 331 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
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The Abigail Alliance decision generated considerable interest from 
various constituencies. On one side, libertarian, free-market proponents 
supported the strong recognition of individual rights.
71
 On the other side, 
public health and consumer safety advocates urged a more paternalistic or 
proregulatory stance on new drug development.
72
 Meanwhile, in step with 
the panel decision, the FDA proposed amendments to regulations 
governing premarket access to experimental drugs, beyond the agency‘s 
existing ―compassionate use‖ and ―emergency use‖ case-by-case 
exceptions.
73
 In addition, both sides of the aisle in Congress supported 
more liberal access.
74
  
On rehearing, the en banc D.C. Circuit Court reversed the panel‘s 
decision. The en banc court reframed the issue not as a right to decide 
whether to take potentially life-saving drugs, but as ―a right of access to 
experimental drugs that have passed limited safety trials but have not been 
proven safe and effective.‖75 On that question, the court held that the 
purported right was not fundamental or ―deeply rooted in this Nation‘s 
 
 
dissenting) (faulting the Court for allowing ―the State‘s abstract, undifferentiated interests in the 
preservation of life to overwhelm the best interests of Nancy Beth Cruzan‖); see also Hill, supra note 
23, at 330–32 (urging Court to adopt consistent approach to balancing individual patients‘ rights and 
public health); Volokh, supra note 22, at 1815–16 (analogizing access to experimental drugs and 
payment for organs to ―lethal self-defense‖). 
 71. See, e.g., Brief for John E. Calfee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Abigail 
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(No. 04-5350), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1352; 
Volokh, supra note 22, at 1814–16. 
 72. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The 
Case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 205 (2007); see also Beryl Lieff 
Benderly, Experimental Drugs on Trial, SCI. AM., Oct. 2007, at 93; Jerome Groopman, The Right to a 
Trial; Should Dying Patients Have Access to Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 
40. 
 73. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34 (―Treatment use‖), 314.36 (―Emergency use‖) (2008); Expanded Access 
to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 312); see Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug Administration‟s 
Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have They Worked?, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
503, 505 (1995); Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved Drugs, 35 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316 (2007) (critiquing the FDA‘s proposed changes). 
 74. See, e.g., Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients (―ACCESS‖) Act, S. 
1956, 109th Cong. (2005); Press Release, Sam Brownback, U.S. Senate, Legislation Will Ensure 
Terminally-Ill Patients Get Treatment (Nov. 3, 2005) (announcing ACCESS Act), available at 
http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=248248; see also Geeta Anand, Saying No to 
Penelope: Father Seeks Experimental Cancer Drug, But a Biotech Firm Says Risk Is Too High, WALL 
ST. J., May 1, 2007, at A1 (―Urged on by [Penelope‘s] family, patient groups and politicians, including 
the staff of House Speaker Pelosi and [Democratic] Pennsylvania Gov. Edward Rendell, lobbied on 
behalf of giving the drug to the child.‖). 
 75. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
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history and tradition.‖76 In the wake of the reversal, congressional 
proposals have been renewed,
77
 and the FDA‘s expanded guidelines are 
still forthcoming.
78
 The Abigail Alliance plaintiffs sought U.S. Supreme 
Court review, which the Court denied summarily.
79
 
Perhaps motivated by overwhelming compassion for terminally ill 
patients or strong adherence to protection of individual rights, proponents 
of expanding access to experimental drugs fail to consider the public 
health right. In particular, allowing patients to try unproven treatments 
outside of controlled clinical trials risks both the validity of the scientific 
study and the health of other patients who might benefit from the 
deliberate, careful process of new drug approval.
80
 In a remarkable 
decision, the D.C. Circuit panel identified a new fundamental 
constitutional right.
81
 The en banc court framed the asserted right 
differently and, accordingly, reached the opposite conclusion, restoring the 
state of the law to the place that most of us thought it did (and should) 
occupy.
82
 Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has declined the case, the en 
banc decision is the last judicial word on the matter.
83
 Unfortunately, the 
opinion fails to provide a satisfying rationale for its holding. The concept 
 
 
 76. Id. at 697 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). 
 77. ACCESS Act, H.R. 6270, 110th Cong. (2008) (introduced June 12, 2008, by Rep. Diane 
Watson); ACCESS Act, S. 3046, 110th Cong. (2008); Press Release, Sam Brownback, U.S. Senate, 
Brownback Introduces Access, Compassion, Love, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act (May 21, 
2008) (reintroducing ACCESS Act), http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=298216. 
 78. Expanded Access to Investigated Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,156 
(Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 79. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 128 S. Ct. 
1069 (2008) (mem.); see also David G. Savage, Justices Uphold Ban on Test Drugs for the Dying, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008; Court Declines Experimental Drugs Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 14, 
2008; Walker, supra note 24 (Abigail Alliance cofounder commenting on petition for certiorari). 
 80. See generally Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New Drug 
Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 127, 129–30 (1999) (defining the FDA‘s ―gold standard‖); Benderly, supra note 72, at 93–
99 (suggesting that current FDA new drug approval process may take over eight years but is the ―gold 
standard‖); Colin B. Begg et al., Marketing Drugs Too Early in Testing, 312 SCI. 195 (2006) (letter to 
the editor opposing ACCESS Act); Society for Clinical Trials Board of Directors, The Society for 
Clinical Trials Opposes US Legislation to Permit Marketing of Unproven Medical Therapies for 
Seriously Ill Patients, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 154, 155–56 (2006) [hereinafter Society for Clinical Trials], 
available at http://www.sctweb.org/positionpapers/S.1956-clinical-trials.pdf (opposing ACCESS Act 
based on need for rigorous scientific testing for drug approval). 
 81. Benderly, supra note 72, at 93 (describing the potential of Abigail Alliance to be ―one of the 
most important court decisions ever to affect medical science‖); Hill, supra note 23, at 314 (panel 
decision ―surprised many commentators‖); Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 72, at 205 (describing case 
as ―troubling‖ and having potential to ―reshape the regulation and sale of pharmaceuticals‖). 
 82. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (regarding long-standing personal autonomy 
right). 
 83. Abigail Alliance, 128 S. Ct. at 1069. 
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of a public health right offers an alternative rubric for resolving difficult 
public policy questions. 
A. The Players 
The issue of access to experimental drugs has drawn attention from a 
range of constituents with conflicting interests, in some cases, even among 
members of the same group. Terminally ill patients, pharmaceutical 
companies, government regulators, physicians, and the public all have 
reasons to care about the potentially dramatic change in pharmaceutical 
product testing and marketing. 
1. Patients 
First (and foremost, according to the Abigail Alliance plaintiffs), 
terminally ill patients express a compelling interest in controlling their 
own bodies and ingesting potentially dangerous, or possibly useless and 
costly, substances. Their arguments and interests relating to experimental 
drugs are fully discussed in the opinions, briefs, and supporting materials 
in the case.
84
 A threshold question is: if we truly value bodily autonomy 
and patient self-determination, why limit the inquiry to terminally ill 
patients? Why not recognize any person‘s interest in ingesting potentially 
palliative, curative, or harmful drugs, free from government interference? 
On autonomy grounds alone, there does not appear to be a basis for the 
distinction. 
2. Pharmaceutical Companies 
Next are companies that manufacture and sell pharmaceutical products. 
Their interests may be aligned with patients‘ if their goals are to generate 
profits by increasing sales of their products. But manufacturers‘ interests 
may be opposed to patients‘, in terms of avoiding liability for marketing 
unsafe or unproven products. At first blush, broader availability of 
investigational drugs would seem a boon for drug companies. If they can 
market these inchoate products to terminally ill patients before incurring 
the cost of conducting clinical trials, why not? But there are countervailing 
concerns. Early access to drugs, outside of controlled trials, could 
undermine pharmaceutical companies‘ ultimate goal of full FDA approval, 
if unexplainable adverse reactions to the drug occur and are considered 
 
 
 84. See discussion infra Part III.B (regarding the Abigail Alliance opinions). 
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like trial results.
85
 Moreover, scientific validity of trials could be 
compromised if patients are unwilling to enroll because they can obtain 
the drugs though the free market.
86
 Also, investigational drugs are costly, 
and smaller companies may lack capacity to meet the expanded demand 
for their products.
87
 
Public relations considerations cut both ways for pharmaceutical 
companies. Denying access gives the impression that such companies are 
greedy, motivated by fear of liability and loss of market share, and lacking 
in compassion for dying patients. Allowing access appears opportunistic, 
akin to ―snake oil‖ vendors offering the vain hope of a cure to dying 
patients.
88
 Indeed, no interested parties ever claimed a right to free drugs. 
The legislative and administrative proposals contain express provisions on 
payment.
89
 But opening a pay window to investigational drugs could 
create an ethically questionable and harmful two-tiered market.
90
 
Liability exposure is also a double-edged sword: Manufacturers face 
product liability suits for marketing allegedly dangerous or defective 
products, as well as suits under failure to warn, negligence, and fraud 
theories.
91
 Congressional proposals to expand access to experimental 
 
 
 85. Safety and other concerns may motivate pharmaceutical companies to halt clinical trials 
before they are completed. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(describing Amgen‘s decision to terminate all clinical trials of Parkinson‘s drug ―GDNF‖ based on two 
scientific concerns); George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of 
AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771, 785 & n.51 (1989) (demand for experimental drugs can 
undermine clinical results, citing DuPont AIDS drug Ampligen as an example); Barbara A. Noah, 
Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experimental Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 449 (2000). 
 86. See infra notes 126–44 and accompanying text (listing examples of distortions in drug trials). 
 87. See Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168, 75,170 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (―[M]aking investigational drugs available for expanded access for 
treatment use is potentially costly, especially when many patients are involved.‖); Anand, supra note 
74 (describing experience of small biotech firm Netropix, Inc., noting that ―in a small company with 
limited financial resources and a high risk profile, you really have to reduce the risks to drug 
development‖); Susan Okie, Access Before Approval—A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 5 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 355, 440 (2006) (―One of the biggest limitations [on access to experimental drugs] is 
manufacturing capacity.‖); Talbott, supra note 73, at 318 (noting cost concerns). 
 88. E.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1979) (―Since the turn of the century, 
resourceful entrepreneurs have advertised a wide variety of purportedly simple and painless cures for 
cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of 
colored floodlamps; pastes made from glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral tablets; and ‗Fountain of 
Youth‘ mixtures of spices, oil, and suet.‖); Benforado et al., supra note 65, at 1787 (quoting then-FDA 
Commissioner Mark McClellan on the FDA‘s role in ―rooting out modern purveyors of snake oil‖). 
 89. ACCESS Act, H.R. 6270, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(10) (2008) (―A sponsor or investigator may 
charge for a . . . drug without notifying the Secretary or seeking or obtaining prior approval of the 
amount charged.‖); ACCESS Act S. 3046, 110th Cong., § 3(a)(10) (2008) (same); Charging for 
Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,168. 
 90. See infra notes 131–38 and accompanying text (describing harm from financial incentives). 
 91. See Talbott, supra note 73, at 318 (identifying sponsor liability exposure). 
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drugs would provide immunity from liability to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers,
92
 denying compensation to injured patients but shielding 
manufacturers from some concerns with marketing untested products. But 
there are litigation risks with denying access, too. For example, the Abigail 
Alliance case demonstrates that companies face constitutional, contractual, 
and other legal challenges if they deny access to drugs.
93
  
3. Government Regulators 
Government regulators, namely the FDA, also have a stake in the 
outcome of this debate. If the government‘s authority to restrict access to 
certain products is effectively eliminated by recognition of patients‘ 
fundamental right to drugs, what remains of the FDA‘s legitimate role and 
function? As noted above, if terminally ill patients have a right to 
experimental drugs, it is hard to see why any patient who wants to take 
non-FDA-approved drugs would not have the same right.
94
 Nothing 
suggests that the FDA‘s authority to regulate drugs for terminal illnesses is 
any different than for other conditions. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized, in a case involving the experimental cancer drug 
Laetrile, just that proposition: the FDA‘s authority to regulate drug safety 
is no different with respect to dying patients as nonterminal patients.
95
 
Although Laetrile was available in other countries, the FDA resisted 
 
 
 92. See H.R. 6270, § 3(a)(12) (prohibiting state and federal ―claims of property, personal injury, 
or death caused by, arising out of, or relating to the design, development, clinical testing and 
investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, sale, purchase, donation, dispersing, prescribing, 
administration, efficacy, or use of a drug, biological product, or device‖ subject to the Act); S. 3046, 
§ 3(a)(12) (same).  
 93. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 
F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding constitutional Due Process right to access). But see Abney v. 
Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 553 (rejecting patients‘ state law claims for injunction compelling 
pharmaceutical company to continue supplying experimental drugs). 
 94. See supra Part III.A.1; Leif N. Furmansky, Just Say No to Drugs: The Abigail Alliance and 
the Attempted Abolition of The Food and Drug Administration, 26 BIOTECHNOLOGY. L. REP. 108 
(2007); Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 72, at 207 (noting the panel decision would subject ―the FDA‘s 
regulatory authority . . . to further erosion‖); Stephen R. Kovatis, The Right to Live: Do the Terminally 
Ill Have a Constitutional Right to use Experimental Drugs?, 26 TEMPLE J. SCI. TECH. & ENVT‘L L. 
149, 163 (2007) (noting that panel identified ―history and tradition‖ supporting ―a broad right ‗to act in 
order to save one‘s own life‘‖ but ―nowhere articulated why that right should only apply to the 
terminally ill‖); cf. Hill, supra note 23, at 278–312 (urging consistent recognition of ―a constitutional 
right to protect one‘s health‖ and discussing Abigail, medical marijuana, therapeutic abortion, and 
other cases). 
 95. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979) (―The Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act makes no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients.‖); Annas, supra 
note 85, at 789–92 (postulating that ―the FDA was correct on laetrile and should continue to insist on a 
scientifically valid randomized clinical trial before certifying drugs as safe and effective‖ for both 
terminal and non-terminal patients). 
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making it available in the United States for even terminal patients, because 
―there were no adequate, well-controlled scientific studies of Laetrile‘s 
safety or effectiveness.‖96 So far, case law and agency policy do not 
support a distinction between terminal and nonterminal patients with 
respect to government regulation of experimental drugs. Therefore, the 
right of dying patients to access not-yet-FDA-approved drugs potentially 
undermines the FDA‘s legitimacy and existence. 
Regulatory interests come from two angles, however. Scientists and 
medical researchers view the FDA‘s new drug approval process, 
characterized by rigorous scientific standards and double-blind, controlled 
trials, as the ―gold standard‖ of scientific method.97 As researchers 
themselves suggest: ―[FDA‘s] long history of drug testing provides 
overwhelming evidence that the most reliable data for assessing efficacy is 
that obtained from prospective randomized clinical trials that are 
sufficiently large to establish efficacy at levels of conclusiveness that are 
broadly accepted by the scientific community.‖98 Regulators and the 
research community claim a strong interest in the scientific process, an 
interest distinct from the health of individual patients participating in the 
studies. 
The current push to ease access to experimental drugs is not the first 
incarnation. The 1980s AIDS crisis gave rise to a similar debate and 
ultimately the ―compassionate use‖ exception.99 Then, as now, ―the major 
source of controversy surrounding drug trials for experimental AIDS drugs 
is that the investigators see these trials as research designed to provide 
 
 
 96. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 549. 
 97. See Annas, supra note 85, at 789 (quoting R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF 
CLINICAL RESEARCH 211 (2d ed. 1986)); Benderly, supra note 72, at 94 (―The ‗gold standard‘ of drug 
testing, the double-blind controlled clinical trial, compares an experimental drug against the best 
standard treatment or, sometimes, against an inactive placebo.‖); Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx‟s History 
and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 964 (2007) 
(―Long-term clinical tests provide the best evidence about the safety risks of drugs for chronic use, as 
the history of Vioxx indicates.‖); Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 72, at 207 (―[T]he panel‘s opinion 
usurped the FDA‘s responsibility to balance the risks and benefits of new drugs and strikes at the core 
of the FDA‘s raison d‘etre.‖); Kulynych, supra note 80, at 131 (―In short, the properly conducted RCT 
[random clinical trial] permits an accurate, objective, and scientific assessment of whether a treatment 
works—and if so, how effective it is.‖). 
 98. Society for Clinical Trials, supra note 80, at 155. 
 99. See Groopman, supra note 72, at 42 (describing ACT-UP and other AIDS activists‘ 
campaign, including staging ―die-ins,‖ to encourage the FDA to relax its experimental drugs policy); 
Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening 
Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 295, 308–27 (2000) (discussing ―AIDS, Activism, and 
Pressure for Change‖); Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Note, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due 
(Process): A Case for Expanded Access to Experimental Drugs Through the Political Process, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1288–89 (2008) (describing impact of AIDS on FDA changes in 1980s). 
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generalizable knowledge that may help others, while most individuals 
suffering with AIDS see these trials as therapy designed to benefit 
them.‖100 That hope of treatment or cure motivates participants to enroll, 
but the researchers‘ objective is ―answering scientific questions about 
safety and efficacy rather than providing therapy for individual 
participants.‖101 In that view, the government‘s role in regulating new drug 
approval is principally to ensure the production of scientifically valid 
results, not treating patients. 
Eliminating control groups and requiring researchers to expand 
qualifications for research participants, as congressional proposals 
suggest,
102
 could undermine reliability of results and compromise patient 
safety. The FDA faces considerable criticism that its processes are too 
slow and deliberate, depriving patients of potentially beneficial, life-
saving products.
103
 But past and recent episodes with approved products, 
such as the recent controversies involving Vioxx and Vytorin, suggest that 
the FDA‘s standards may not be rigorous enough.104 As much as the public 
is outraged when the FDA withholds potentially life-saving drugs from 
dying patients,
105
 it is just as angry when dangerous or disappointing drugs 
 
 
 100. Annas, supra note 85, at 773 (footnote omitted); see also Greenberg, supra note 99, at 331 
(describing ―direct conflict between medical treatment and the clinical trial process‖); Benderly, supra 
note 72, at 94 (discussing patients‘ ―therapeutic misconception‖ that trials aim to cure and offer a good 
chance of helping, despite being informed of purpose and statistical likelihood to the contrary). 
 101. Benderly, supra note 72, at 94. 
 102. See Press Release, Sam Brownback, supra note 74 (―This legislation . . . would also ensure 
that dying patients will not be forced to participate in a clinical trial and be given a placebo or sugar 
pill if another reasonable treatment exists.‖). 
 103. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution—Choice at Life‟s End, 4 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 357, 408 (2007) (―Frustration with the methods and slow progress of mainstream medical 
research has helped fuel a resistance movement that distrusts both conventional medicine and 
government,‖ leading to terminally ill patients‘ demands for increased access to experimental drugs). 
 104. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT‘L ACADEMIES, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING 
AND PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2006) (study and recommendations 
requested in aftermath of Vioxx concerns); Gilhooley, supra note 97, at 956–58 (calling for increasing 
rigor in testing procedures); Justin Blum, FDA Accepted 19 Drugs in ‟07, Fewest It Has OK‟d Since 
„83, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Jan. 10, 2008 (―FDA has faced pressure from members of Congress for 
more strict oversight of drug safety since Merck & Co. withdrew painkiller Vioxx in 2004 because of 
increased heart risks.‖). But see Epstein, supra note 34, at 746 (noting the ―controversy over the usage 
of dangerous drugs has now reached a fever-pitch‖ and outlining a ―coherent framework‖ for deciding 
which drugs should get to the market). The controversy surrounding Vytorin was not safety so much as 
efficacy, based on evidence that the combination drug performed no better than the cheaper 
component. See Alex Berenson, Study Reveals Doubt on Drug for Cholesterol, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2008, at A1; Alice Park, Is Vytorin a Failure?, TIME, Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/health/article/0,8599,1703827,00.html (describing study demonstrating that drug was less 
effective at lowering bad cholesterol than results presented to the FDA). 
 105. See, e.g., Peter Huber, FDA Caution Can Be Deadly, Too, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1998, at 
A14; Leibfarth, supra note 99, at 1286–89 (summarizing criticism of ―FDA‘s Gold Standard,‖ 
including expense, delay, and interference with both personal autonomy and physician-patient 
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reach the market.
106
 Thus, the FDA faces contradictory pressures to both 
speed access and better ensure safety and efficacy.
107
 
4. Physicians 
The drugs at issue are available only after FDA approval and with a 
physician‘s prescription. Thus, physicians‘ interests matter, too. The 
Abigail Alliance opinions assumed the existence of physicians willing to 
prescribe and administer experimental drugs to dying patients. But 
physicians may have good reasons for reluctance to serve as intermediaries 
between patients wanting to take experimental drugs and pharmaceutical 
companies wanting to sell them. As pharmaceutical companies 
increasingly market prescription drugs directly to consumers, patients have 
become active consumers—asking their doctors to prescribe new drugs 
that they hear about rather than waiting for doctors to tell them.
108
 The 
Abigail Alliance and other patients‘ rights organizations are well informed 
about clinical trials and other developments in the treatment of their 
conditions, often by compiling Internet resources and other databases of 
ongoing trials and enrollment procedures.
109
 
 
 
relationship); Clifton Leaf, Deadly Caution: How Our National Obsession with Drug Safety is Killing 
People—And What We Can Do About It, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 9, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/02/20/8369155/index.htm (―The approval process is 
broken—but not in the way most people think. It is in thrall to a well-intentioned but ultimately 
misguided national obsession: the quest for certainty about drug safety and efficacy.‖); see also 
Implants and Science, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006, at A16 (applauding the FDA‘s decision to lift ban 
on silicone breast implants as victory of science over politics: ―Women will at last be allowed to make 
their own decisions about cosmetic surgery. This is especially welcome news for mastectomy 
patients.‖). 
 106. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 34, at 741–45 (describing public pressure to pull drugs from the 
market and increase regulatory oversight); Groopman, supra note 72, at 47 (describing concerns of 
―critics who believe that the F.D.A. needs stricter drug regulations‖). 
 107. Rochelle Sharpe, FDA Tries to Find Right Balance on Drug Approvals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
20, 1999, at A24 (―The [FDA] is caught in pincers between two intense political pressures: demands 
from the industry and the political right to move faster and faster in approving drugs, and rising 
insistence from consumer groups and the left to show more caution.‖). 
 108. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT 
OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS (2002); Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and 
Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1135, 1170–79. 
 109. E.g., Center Watch, Search Clinical Trials, http://www.centerwatch.com/clinical-trials/ 
listings (last visited May 9, 2009) (listing ―[i]ndustry sponsors [that] are actively recruiting patients for 
clinical trials‖); Novartis, Clinical Trial and Medical Research Information, http://www.novartis 
clinicaltrials.com/webapp/etrials/home.do (last visited May 9, 2009) (providing information for 
patients and caregivers); Annas, supra note 103, at 408 (―Today, families search the Internet for 
clinical trials, and even untested chemicals . . . that seem to offer some hope.‖); Greenberg, supra note 
99, at 312 (describing AIDS activists efforts to promote access to new treatments through ―alternative, 
gray market channels‖). 
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Physicians face ethical and liability concerns. On one hand, the 
―learned intermediary‖ doctrine of products liability law exposes 
physicians to potential liability for dispensing dangerous drugs without 
adequately warning of their risks, instead of strict liability passing through 
to the manufacturer for failure to directly warn the patient.
110
 On the other 
hand, physicians may fear liability if they refuse to prescribe experimental 
drugs, since they are held to the standard of care of the profession.
111
 
Accordingly, if enough oncologists (or other comparable specialists) 
prescribe experimental drugs and that treatment becomes the standard of 
care, a physician who refuses may be liable for medical malpractice.
112
 
5. The Public 
In addition to patients currently suffering from terminal conditions, 
future patients with serious illnesses may be adversely impacted if the 
market for experimental drugs opens. Why would a patient who 
desperately wants a drug enroll in a traditional ―gold standard‖ clinical 
trial and risk being assigned to a placebo or control group, rather than buy 
the drug upfront? Congressional proposals would allow patients to access 
such drugs directly, without enrolling in clinical trials and facing that very 
risk.
113
 Manufacturers could sell drugs without the expense, effort, and risk 
of failure associated with conducting full trials. The combined effect of 
fewer patients enrolling and decreased incentive for manufacturers to 
conduct full trials could seriously hamper scientific research and 
 
 
 110. E.g., Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591–92 (Tex. 1986); Terhune v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977–78 (Wash. 1978) (citing cases); see also In re Norplant Contraceptive 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying doctrine even to prescription drugs 
advertised directly to patients). 
 111. E.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (―Whether a defendant has or 
has not conformed his conduct to a customary practice is generally only evidence of whether he has 
acted as a reasonably prudent person. In a malpractice case, however, the question of whether the 
defendant acted in conformity with the common practice within his profession is the heart of the suit.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
 112. See Peter D. Jacobson et al., Litigating the Science of Breast Cancer Treatment, 32 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 785, 799 (2007) (discussing routine use of HDC/ABMT among oncologists, 
resulting in judges finding the treatment within the standard of care, despite experimental status); 
Francis C. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug 
Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 438 (2002) (describing pressure on physicians to 
prescribe advertised drugs and strain on professional responsibility to patient and practice standards). 
 113. See Press Release, Sam Brownback, supra note 74 (describing ACCESS Act); Press Release, 
Sam Brownback, supra note 77 (same); Society for Clinical Trials, supra note 80, at 155 (―[T]he [Act] 
prohibits the use of placebo-only or no-treatment-only concurrent controls in any clinical 
investigations conducted under [the Act].‖). 
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undermine drug innovation.
114
 As one commentator summarized: ―[T]he 
premature introduction of new drugs may create additional problems in the 
form of ambiguity surrounding the comparative efficacy of different 
treatments, or a reduction in the pool of individuals willing to participate 
as subjects in double-blind clinical trials.‖115 Several scenarios illustrate 
the validity of those concerns. 
First, diethylstilbestrol (―DES‖), a synthetic version of estrogen, was 
widely prescribed—initially to women with risks of miscarriage, later to 
pregnant women in general—like a prenatal vitamin, to promote healthier 
babies.
116
 DES reached the U.S. market in the 1930s, free of patent 
restrictions and only nominal, on-paper statements about the drug‘s 
purpose and apparent safety, under the FDA‘s brand-new drug approval 
requirements.
117
 Accordingly, DES was never systematically tested 
through controlled clinical trials in the U.S.; tragically, the drug was later 
revealed to cause a rare form of cancer in treated women‘s young-adult 
daughters.
118
 It was especially difficult to assess cancer risks of DES for 
the public at large because patients who took the drug tended to be upper-
class white women who had access to gynecological care.
119
 Variables 
particular to that subgroup could not be isolated or identified, nor could 
 
 
 114. See Annas, supra note 103, at 412 (―The drug companies are right to worry that the 
approaches of the judiciary, Congress, and the FDA will probably make clinical trials more difficult to 
conduct, because few seriously ill patients who have exhausted conventional treatments would rather 
be randomly assigned to an investigational drug than have a guarantee that they will receive the 
investigational drug their physician recommends for them.‖); Furmansky, supra note 94, at 113 
(describing effect on clinical trials if early access is granted and patients no longer volunteer for 
double-blind trials); Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A 
Contractarian Model of Access, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 436–38 (1994) (describing randomized, 
double-blind, placebo-controlled experiments as ―undoubtably the most scientifically sound means‖ 
producing statistically significant data on safety and effectiveness, although arguing for more open 
access and value of other information sources); Kevin M. Hill et al., The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: 
A Review of Internal Documents, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 256 (2008) (suggesting that 
―seeding trials,‖ designed to promote pharmaceutical companies‘ new products, are ―harmful to 
science and society‖ because of lower patient enrollment and quality control ―when marketing is the 
primary purpose of the study‖). 
 115. Greenberg, supra note 99, at 297. 
 116. Anita Bernstein, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.: Markets of Mothers, in TORT STORIES 151, 
154 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 117. In the 1930s, the FDA‘s new drug application required minimal evidence of the drug‘s 
safety; the efficacy requirement was not added until 1962. See Bernstein, supra note 116, at 153 & n.9, 
155; see infra note 170 (citing additional sources on history of the FDA new drug approval process). 
 118. W. J. Dieckmann et al., Does the Administration of Diethylstibestrol During Pregnancy Have 
Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1062 (1953) (describing nonrandomized 
DES trials); Bernstein, supra note 116, at 153 & n.9. 
 119. See Bernstein, supra note 116, at 155 (describing how DES was made available to the public 
without undergoing randomized, controlled clinical trials, and that the ―exposed population was mostly 
white, upper-income, and reasonably well educated‖). 
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the affects be generalized for a whole population. Had DES been 
systematically tested in accordance with accepted scientific methods, the 
tragic results to prospective patients might have been avoided. 
Another scenario involved Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant with 
High Dose Chemotherapy (ABMT/HDC), a novel treatment for certain 
cancers; the treatment was accepted for leukemia and Hodgkin‘s disease 
and showed early promise for breast and ovarian cancers.
120
 Based on 
initial clinical results, physicians began recommending ABMT/HDC for 
other cancers; accordingly, patients began asking their health insurers to 
cover it. But insurers refused to cover the treatment, citing ―experimental‖ 
or ―not medically necessary‖ insurance contract exclusions.121 Patients 
rallied, and a number of courts ruled against the insurers, requiring them to 
pay.
122
 Eventually, complete clinical trials demonstrated that ABMT/HDC 
was no more effective than traditional treatments.
123
 The public pressure to 
make the treatment available (as a practical matter) under insurance 
coverage accelerated its clinical application, despite lack of complete 
scientific information about its effectiveness, to painful and unnecessary 
results.
124
 Those and many other cases illustrate the risks of allowing 
access to potential ―miracle drugs‖ before they have been fully tested.125 
The risks of underenrollment and clinical trial disruption are 
demonstrated by the AIDS drug trials in the late 1980s. Clinical trials of 
azidothymidine (AZT) on HIV-positive people (who had not yet 
 
 
 120. See Lubeznik v. HealthChicago, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (describing 
treatment history). 
 121. Jacobson et al., supra note 112, at 786–87 (describing litigation). 
 122. See, e.g., id. But see Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(denying coverage); Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). 
 123. See E. Haavi Morreim, From the Clinics to the Courts: The Role Evidence Should Play in 
Litigating Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 409, 411–13 (2001); Karen H. Antman et al., 
High Dose Chemotherapy for Breast Cancer, 282 JAMA 1701 (1999); Leaf, supra note 105 (―Clinical 
trials revealed that high-dose chemotherapy followed by a bone-marrow transplant, a once-common, 
brutal, and often deadly therapy for breast cancer, wasn‘t necessary.‖). 
 124. See RICHARD A. RETTIG ET AL., FALSE HOPE: BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR 
BREAST CANCER (2007) (describing how providers‘ and insurers‘ enthusiasm for experimental 
HDC/ABMT to treat metastatic breast cancer made it difficult to enroll patients in randomized 
controlled trials, which eventually showed the procedure was much less effective than believed); 
Benderly, supra note 72, at 99 (regarding HDC/ABMT: ―Thousands of women underwent, and some 
died from, this excruciating and costly experimental procedure after a lawsuit forced insurers to pay 
but before clinical trials finally proved it no more effective than standard therapy.‖). 
 125. See Okie, supra note 87, at 440 (Quoting pharmaceutical industry executive: ―[T]he whole 
purpose of large clinical trials is to fully evaluate benefits and risks . . . and short-changing that is not 
in patients‘ best interests.‖); Society for Clinical Trials, supra note 80, at 156 (listing numerous 
examples, including drugs for heart disease and Lou Gehrig‘s disease that showed initial promise but 
ultimately harmful effects, evident only after placebo-controlled randomized trials). 
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developed AIDS) were seriously undermined by underenrollment.
126
 In 
New York City, after five months of trying, researchers enrolled only 244 
volunteers, out of a population of 200,000 HIV-infected individuals, in 
one of the most important AIDS trials to date.
127
 Reasons for low 
enrollment included hostility to the FDA‘s slow pace of new drug 
approval, concerns about being relegated to placebos, and ability to obtain 
AZT and other drugs through gray markets.
128
 Most patients, in 
consultation with their doctors, opted instead to take unproven drugs, 
rather than enroll in randomized, controlled trials.
129
 The results were 
further undermined by research subjects who, fearing they were receiving 
the placebo, cheated by taking supplemental drugs without informing 
research sponsors.
130
 
Moreover, allowing patients to purchase experimental drugs could 
create a two-tiered system for experimental drugs. Patients with financial 
means to purchase the drugs and resources to inform themselves about the 
drugs‘ availability might choose that option. Meanwhile, patients who 
cannot afford to purchase drugs or are less well-informed would be 
relegated to traditional trials. Typically, there is no charge for drugs 
provided to clinical trial participants.
131
 Outside of controlled trials, 
pharmaceutical companies could charge patients because Congress and the 
FDA would expressly allow it.
132
 The preamble to the FDA‘s proposed 
amendments allowing drug companies to charge for investigational drugs 
explained: 
 
 
 126. See Gina Kolata, Recruiting Problems in New York Slowing U.S. Trials of AIDS Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1988, at 1; Annas, supra note 85, at 786–87 (describing same); Greenberg, supra note 
99, at 314 (noting that research subjects may ―modify or supplement treatment in order to optimize a 
personal assessment of welfare‖). 
 127. See Kolata, supra note 126. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Annas, supra note 85, at 786–87 (noting that patients‘ taking drugs outside the trials ―on the 
sly‖ further undermined results); Kolata, supra note 126 (quoting chairman of national study: ―We‘re 
worried about cheating all the time.‖). 
 131. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d) (2008) (providing that ―[c]harging for an investigational drug in a 
clinical trial under an IND is not permitted without the prior written approval of FDA‖). But see 
Annas, supra note 85, at 779 (―[R]esearch drugs are no longer universally delivered free . . . [which] 
makes it even more difficult for patients suffering from disease to distinguish recognized therapy from 
early experimentation . . . .‖). 
 132. ACCESS Act, H.R. 6270, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(10) (2008) (―A sponsor or investigator may 
charge for a Compassionate Investigational Access drug without notifying the Secretary or seeking or 
obtaining prior approval of the amount charged.‖); S. 3046, 110th Cong., § 3(a)(10) (2008) (same); 
Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 312). 
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Charging for the cost of an investigational drug for expanded access 
for treatment use is a very different situation from charging for a 
drug in a clinical trial. Treatment use is not a necessary part of the 
drug development process and does not benefit the pharmaceutical 
companies by leading to systematic accumulation of data intended 
to support marketing authorization. Rather, treatment use is 
primarily intended to benefit very sick patients by permitting them 
to receive investigational drugs to treat their diseases and 
conditions, with collection of information about the drug being 
incident to the intent to treat.
133
  
The agency further expressed a desire ―to encourage sponsors to make 
investigational drugs available‖ but recognized that ―making 
investigational drugs available . . . for treatment use is potentially costly‖; 
thus, sponsors should be permitted to charge for them.
134
 That discussion 
further supports the concerns about conflicting interests of research and 
therapy.
135
 When conducting trials, companies are primarily concerned 
with science; when providing drugs outside of trials, costs become a 
significant motivator. 
These concerns are exacerbated by private health insurers and 
government health care programs that do not cover experimental treatment 
on the grounds that it is not ―medically necessary‖ because approved, 
traditional treatment options exist.
136
 A two-tiered system, with patients 
who lack resources enrolling in traditional trials and patients with 
 
 
 133. Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,170. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text (describing dissonance between researchers‘ 
and patients‘ objectives in clinical trials). 
 136. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 211, 
242–45 (1997) (discussing insurance contract exclusions based on medical necessity or experimental 
status); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers‟ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1677–79 (1992) (regarding courts‘ interpretation of medical necessity of 
experimental treatment, citing ABMT example); Jacobson et al., supra note 112, at 797 (discussing 
coverage determinations and application of ―medical necessity‖ provisions to HDC/ABMT); see, e.g., 
Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994) (denying coverage for HDC/ABMT); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(B) (2000) (excluding coverage for items or services ―not reasonable 
and necessary for the prevention of illness‖). Federal and state reforms expanded coverage for 
experimental treatment. See Memorandum on Increasing Participation of Medicare Beneficiaries in 
Clinical Trials, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1107 (June 7, 2000) (providing that Medicare covers ―routine costs‖ for 
patients enrolled in clinical trials, but not all expenses, including complications and injuries, associated 
with participation), adopted in DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CMS PUB. NO. 100–06, 
MEDICARE NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS MANUAL § 310.1 (2007); National Cancer 
Institute, States that Require Health Plans to Cover Patient Care Costs in Clinical Trials, 
http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/developments/laws-about-clinical-trial-costs (last visited May 9, 
2009) (map of states). 
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resources purchasing experimental drugs on the free market, is not only 
morally offensive, but also a threat to the validity of clinical trials.
137
 
Recent reports on the growing market for paid clinical trial participants 
suggest that this outcome is not far-fetched.
138
  
In addition, failing to enroll or allowing an entire cohort of research 
subjects to opt out of trials, based on socioeconomic or other potentially 
significant differences, could undermine results, as the DES case 
illustrated.
139
 The DES results were revealing for only upper-class white 
women and failed to account for other variables or provide generalizable 
data. Another example of distortions in the testing cohort is the drug 
BiDil, which was touted as the first drug developed specifically to treat 
heart disease in African Americans.
140
 Seeing a potentially lucrative 
market for ―race-specific drugs,‖ the clinical trials enrolled only African 
Americans.
141
 Other flaws in the research methodology and data 
interpretation produced results that could not reliably suggest any racial 
difference in the etiology or treatment of heart disease.
142
 Moreover, the 
research failed to produce any evidence helpful for determining whether 
 
 
 137. See, e.g., Carl Elliott & Roberto Abadie, Exploiting a Research Underclass in Phase 1 
Clinical Trials, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2316, 2316–17 (2008) (noting financial and other pressures on 
poor people to enroll as research subjects and incentives to falsify medical histories); Carl Elliott, 
Guinea-Pigging, NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 2008, at 36 (discussing subjects‘ noncompliance with diet and 
other restrictions during testing and reluctance to report adverse reactions or other discomfort for fear 
of being excluded from future trials). 
 138. See Laurie P. Cohen, To Screen New Drugs for Safety, Lilly Pays Homeless Alcoholics, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1996, at A1 (exposé on Lilly‘s practices at Indianapolis testing facility); Elliott 
& Abadie, supra note 137, at 2316 (discussing research industry‘s ―‗shadow economy‘ of paid human 
subjects‖); Elliott & Abadie, supra note 137 (quoting Alan Milstein, attorney for Jesse Gelsinger, 
teenager who died in the notorious University of Pennsylvania gene-therapy clinical trial: ―This is not 
something you or I do. . . . This is something the poor do so that the rich can get better drugs.‖). 
 139. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 116, at 153 & n.9, 155 (noting that DES was made available 
to the public without undergoing randomized, controlled clinical trials and ―exposed population was 
mostly white, upper-income, and reasonably well educated‖); See also Dieckmann et al., supra note 
118, at 1062–81 (describing nonrandomized DES trials). 
 140. Jonathan Kahn, Letter to the Editor, Misreading Race and Genomics After BiDil, 37 NATURE 
GENETICS 655, 655 (2005) (―BiDil is noteworthy because it may become the first race-specific drug 
ever approved by the FDA.‖); see also Ron Chepesiuk, Are Race-Specific Drugs Unethical?, BLACK 
ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.blackenterprise.com/magazine/2005/11/01/are-race-specific-
drugs-unethical/. 
 141. Kahn, supra note 140, at 655 (noting ―dynamic relation between markets and the skewed 
interpretation of clinical trial data‖); Robert Temple & Norman L. Stockbridge, BiDil for Heart 
Failure in Black Patients: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration Perspective, 146 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 57, 57 (2007) (noting ―entirely black patient population‖ in critical clinical trial of 
BiDil). 
 142. Chepesiuk, supra note 140 (questioning clinical basis and results); Kahn, supra note 140, at 
655 (same). But see Temple & Stockbridge, supra note 141, at 57–61 (defending FDA approval of 
BiDil, despite criticism). 
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non-African American patients could benefit equally from the drug.
143
 
Similarly, initial trials of AZT were conducted almost exclusively on gay 
white males and were later considered questionable in terms of predicting 
efficacy in the general population.
144
 These examples illustrate that the 
push for access to experimental drugs may undermine the scientific 
validity of studies and also compromise other and future patients‘ health 
and safety. 
Accordingly, the public‘s interest in restricting access to experimental 
drugs aligns with the government‘s interest in maintaining the FDA‘s 
role,
145
 but may be opposed to individual rights. This tension is a classic 
public health law dilemma: how to ensure the health of a population while 
recognizing the rights of individuals.
146
 Mandatory vaccination benefits 
the public greatly by reducing the risk of infectious diseases, but liberty 
and autonomy interests of some individuals are necessarily infringed.
147
 
Similarly, the public interest in scientifically sound clinical trials may 
benefit the public greatly, while impairing individuals‘ interests in 
obtaining the drugs before they are approved.
148
 
 
 
 143. See Kahn, supra note 140, at 655–56 (2005) (describing drug developed and marketed to 
African American population and noting that clinical trails expressly ―enrolled only ‗self-identified‘ 
African Americans; there was no comparison population‖ and ―skewed interpretation of clinical 
data‖); Temple & Stockbridge, supra note 141, at 59 (discussing concerns about ―inadequate 
representation of women, elderly people, black people, and other groups in the drug development 
process‖ leading to ―incorrect conclusions for those groups about benefits or adverse effects of 
treatments‖); see also Chepesiuk, supra note 140. 
 144. See Greenberg, supra note 99, at 313. 
 145. See Okie, supra note 87, at 440 (Quoting pharmaceutical industry executive: ―[T]he whole 
purpose of large clinical trials is to fully evaluate benefits and risks . . . and short-changing that is not 
in patients‘ best interests.‖); O. Carter Snead, Unenumerated Rights and the Limits of Analogy: A 
Critique of the Right to Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 1–2 (2007) (responding to 
Volokh, supra note 22, and noting: ―FDA restricts access to unapproved drugs . . . to maintain a 
functional clinical trial system (the chief mechanism of bringing safe and effective drugs to the 
market).‖). 
 146. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, supra note 7, at 23–24 (noting 
public health‘s ―emphasis on the well-being of the population as opposed to clinical benefits for 
individuals‖); Baum et al., supra note 20, at 657, 658 & n.1 (noting ―public health ethics also tend to 
emphasize the role of social justice compared to the predominance of autonomy‖ and citing sources); 
Shattuck, supra note 31, at 25–27 (responding to concern that public health measures may interfere 
with private matters: ―No family, no person liveth to himself alone. Every person has a direct or 
indirect interest in every other person.‖); Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to 
Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL‘Y 27, 33–34 (2007) (describing and giving 
examples of public health tension with individual rights). 
 147. See supra notes 43–51 (describing mandatory vaccination debate and ―commons‖ analogy). 
 148. See Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (1980) (noting the FDA‘s authority to 
restrict access to experimental drugs ―is within the area of governmental interest in protecting public 
health‖); Furmansky, supra note 94, at 114 (―In this case, the good of the many must certainly 
outweigh the potential, (though not certain), good of the few.‖); Snead, supra note 145, at 1–2 (―The 
FDA restricts access to unapproved drugs (subject to certain exceptions) in the interest of public 
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B. The Opinions 
During the brief sixteen-month period that the Abigail Alliance panel 
decision was on the books as good law, it generated considerable 
interest.
149
 After the surprising panel decision, the government requested 
rehearing; the three-judge panel denied the request,
150
 but the full court 
granted en banc review.
151
 On March 1, 2007, the en banc court heard the 
case and, on August 7, 2008, reversed the panel and affirmed the district 
court, which had declined to recognize a right to experimental 
treatment.
152
 In January 2008, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
153
 The 
various attempts to articulate the purported right in question clarifies the 
true interest at stake—the public‘s.  
1. Panel Decision 
On May 2, 2006, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit recognized a 
fundamental constitutional right for terminally ill patients to take drugs 
that the FDA has not yet approved for marketing.
154
 The panel then 
remanded the case back to the district court to determine, on the merits, 
whether the FDA violated that interest.
155
 The plaintiffs were the Abigail 
Alliance, a patient advocacy organization, and Washington Legal 
Foundation, a consumer rights activist organization.
156
 In 2001, Frank 
 
 
health, that is, to prevent patient exposure to unsafe or ineffective drugs and to maintain a functional 
clinical trial system.‖). 
 149. See, e.g., Furmansky, supra note 94, at 117 (―Desperately ill terminal patients should not be 
allowed to take so many other lives into their own hands . . . .‖); Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 72, at 
207–08 (urging the full court to reexamine the ―panel‘s aggressively individualistic view, one that 
breathtakingly slights the public‘s interest in drug safety‖); see also Hill, supra note 23, at 277; 
Volokh, supra note 22, at 1828–32. 
 150. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 
129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting the FDA‘s challenge to Abigail Alliance‘s standing to bring the 
constitutional challenge and denying motion for rehearing).  
 151. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 152. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004) (district 
court dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, suing in the name of former FDA 
Commissioner, Mark McClellan). 
 153. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 128 S. Ct. 
1069 (2008). 
 154. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 472. 
 155. Id. at 486 (district court erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim and for refusing to 
recognize asserted fundamental right).  
 156. For information on Abigail Alliance, see Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs, http://abigail-alliance.org/ (last visited May 9, 2009). For information on 
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Burroughs founded the Abigail Alliance. His daughter, Abigail, was 
diagnosed at age nineteen with squamous cell carcinoma in her neck and 
lungs. Her oncologist recommended her for clinical trials of two 
investigational drugs, but she did not qualify because she had a different 
type of cancer. As her father summarized, ―she had the right type of cancer 
cells . . . in the wrong place.‖ After Abigail died at age twenty-one, 
Burroughs and Steven Walker, whose terminally ill wife had been 
similarly excluded from trials, co-founded the Abigail Alliance.
157
 
The defendants were FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach and 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Michael 
Leavitt.
158
 The litigation operated from several assumptions: that drug 
companies would willingly provide their preapproved products to dying 
patients; that patients would willingly pay for the drugs; and that doctors 
would willingly prescribe the drugs. Thus, Abigail‘s only obstacle to a 
possible cure or treatment was government regulators ―interfering‖ with 
her right to decide whether to assume the risks of using potentially life-
saving, investigational new drugs.
159
 The complaint framed the issue as 
whether terminally ill patients who have exhausted all other government-
approved treatment options have a constitutional due process right to pre-
FDA-approved, experimental drugs that may prolong their lives.
160
 The 
district court, after rejecting the defendants‘ ripeness, finality, and 
exhaustion arguments,
161
 held that the plaintiffs failed to state a recognized 
due process claim on which relief could be granted and dismissed the 
complaint.
162
 
On appeal, the Abigail Alliance panel held, two to one, that the 
plaintiffs stated a claim on their asserted constitutional right to 
 
 
Washington Legal Foundation, see Washington Legal Foundation, http://wlf.org/ (last visited May 9, 
2009).  
 157. See Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle 
an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, Sept. 2007, at 25, available at http://abigail-alliance.org/ 
LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf. 
 158. When the case was filed, Mark McClellan was FDA Commissioner and Tommy Thompson 
was Secretary of HHS. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, 
No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004). 
 159. See Robert A. Bohrer, The Abigail Alliance and the Role of the FDA, 26 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 
REP. 107, 107 (―The notion that the FDA is impermissibly interfering with the rights of terminally ill 
patients and drug companies to choose freely for themselves the terms of their agreements seems to be 
a necessary underpinning of the Abigail Alliance court‘s right to access experimental treatments.‖). 
 160. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 472 (―[T]he right at issue, carefully described, is the right of a 
mentally competent, terminally ill adult patient to access potentially life-saving post-Phase I 
investigational new drugs, upon a doctor‘s advice, even where that medication carries risks for the 
patient.‖). 
 161. 2004 WL 3777340, at *2–8.  
 162. Id. at *9–11. 
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experimental drugs.
163
 The court recognized not just any constitutional 
right, but a fundamental right—the type to which we give the most 
constitutional protection. The court guised the new right in liberty and 
privacy, likening it to previously recognized constitutional rights to use 
contraceptives,
164
 have abortions,
165
 refuse medical treatment,
166
 and 
engage in intimate association.
167
 Specifically, the panel held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution protects the right of a terminally ill 
patient to make an informed decision to use potentially life-saving drugs 
that the FDA has not yet approved for commercial marketing.
168
  
The court limited its holding in several significant respects. First, the 
right extended only to terminally ill, mentally competent patients. Also, 
the patients must have exhausted all other options, and they must consult 
with their doctors. In addition, the right extended only to drugs approved 
for human clinical trials and passed Phase I of the FDA‘s new drug 
approval process. The two-judge majority and some commentators relied 
heavily on the erroneous assertion that Phase I conclusively settles the 
question of drug safety.
169
 In fact, Phase I merely establishes preliminary 
dosage ranges and demonstrates that the drugs are not toxic or poisonous 
to humans. In Phase I, the drug is tested on small numbers of subjects, 
typically twenty to eighty, who may or may not have the disease for which 
the drug is indicated.
170
 If a drug passes Phase I, researchers still do not 
 
 
 163. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486. 
 164. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that Connecticut law forbidding use 
of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy); see also Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that law allowing distribution of contraceptives to married 
but not single people violated equal protection). 
 165. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that constitutional right of privacy is broad 
enough to encompass woman‘s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy but that state may 
have compelling justifications for limiting right); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (affirming Roe but replacing trimester approach with 
―undue burden‖ test). 
 166. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep‘t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment). 
 167. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of 
the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct impinged on Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interests). 
 168. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 484 (discussing Cruzan and noting that ―similar analysis leads 
to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause protects the liberty interest claimed by the Alliance for 
its terminally ill members‖). 
 169. Id. at 472–75; see, e.g., Volokh, supra note 22, at 1830 & n.79 (―The insufficiency of such 
government interests should be especially clear when the drugs have passed Phase I . . . but it should 
be so even if the drugs have not been tested for safety.‖). 
 170. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2008) (describing Phase I, including fact that ―studies may be 
conducted in patients or normal volunteer subjects‖); Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473; Okie, supra 
note 87, at 438–49 (describing Phases and noting that Phase I provides ―preliminary information about 
safety‖); see also PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW 514–16 (2d ed. 
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know whether it will work as indicated or whether the benefits will 
outweigh the risks—they merely know that humans will not immediately 
suffer harm or death by taking it. As Judge Griffith (the panel dissenter) 
noted, both the remaining Phases and post-approval reporting continue to 
establish not only efficacy but also safety.
171
 
Aside from misunderstanding the FDA‘s new drug approval process, 
the panel majority‘s reliance on Phase I awkwardly derives a fundamental, 
constitutional right from a federal administrative agency‘s regulatory 
scheme. The very agency whose validity and purpose is thrown into 
question by recognizing the right provides the rules that define its 
recognition.
172
 If the FDA changes the rules, redefines the Phases, or 
otherwise alters the regulatory playing field, would the recognized 
fundamental right still exist? Tying the purported right to agency rules 
seems tenuous at best—hardly a fundamental constitutional right. Even if 
the court‘s operating presumption about the Phase I were correct, the only 
imaginable justification for prohibiting access to unsafe (i.e., pre-Phase I) 
drugs while allowing access to ineffective (i.e., post-Phase I) drugs, seems 
to be paternalism—and limited paternalism, at that, to protect patients 
from bodily harm but not monetary loss or consumer fraud to which they 
may be exposed by purchasing costly, ineffective products. 
Perhaps the real explanation for the panel‘s limiting of the Abigail 
Alliance right to drugs approved through Phase I was the need to 
maneuver around Supreme Court precedent. In United States v. 
Rutherford,
173
 the Court held that terminal cancer patients could not access 
Laetrile, an experimental drug that had not yet passed Phase I.
174
 Laetrile, 
 
 
1991) (describing the FDA‘s process for approving new drugs and three Phases); Benderly, supra note 
72, at 95 (describing Phases); Greenberg, supra note 99, at 304–06 (describing Phases). As discussed 
above, Phase I trials may include paid research subjects who do not suffer from the condition being 
tested. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 171. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 488–89 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (―The majority and I differ in 
our understanding of the importance of the testing that occurs after Phase I. . . . Contrary to the 
majority‘s suggestion, all phases of the FDA‘s testing process for new drugs involve testing for 
safety.‖); see Postmarketing Reporting of Adverse Drug Experiences, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2008); see 
also Epstein, supra note 34, at 756 (noting relevance of safety and effectiveness in all three Phases); 
Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 72, at 206 (noting safety concerns revealed throughout all Phases); 
Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Health Roundup, 312 SCI. 1105, 1105 (2006) (noting Abigail Alliance 
court‘s error in that ―Phase I testing simply seeks to determine appropriate dosage ranges; it does not 
establish safety‖). 
 172. See supra Part III.A.3 (suggesting that expanded access to experimental drugs threatens the 
FDA‘s existence). 
 173. 442 U.S. 544 (1979). 
 174. Id. at 546–49 (noting that Laetrile was a ―new drug,‖ having not been determined as safe or 
effective by the FDA); see HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 170, at 557–58 (describing FDA enforcement 
against unproven cancer treatments and Laetrile issue); Furmansky, supra note 94, at 109–10 
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a drug derived from apricot pits and available in Mexico and Canada, 
where cancer patients by the thousands traveled to obtain it, was not even 
in experimental trials in the United States.
175
 The drugs that the Abigail 
Alliance sought, by contrast, had been approved at least through Phase I. 
That distinction made all the difference to the Abigail Alliance panel 
majority.
176
 According to the court, by not seeking access to pre–Phase I 
drugs, the Abigail Alliance demonstrated that they were not seeking an 
―unfettered right of access,‖177 thus distinguishing their claim from 
Rutherford. But the court‘s myopic focus on, and misunderstanding of, 
Phase I, caused them to miss the issue: whether the Constitution mandates 
access to possibly dangerous, ineffective experimental drugs, even outside 
of the controls that Congress and the FDA have in place.
178
 
The panel also limited patients‘ access to experimental drugs ―upon a 
doctor‘s advice,‖ again muddling the analysis. Like the Phase I limit on 
the right, the ―doctor‘s advice‖ limit ties the constitutional right to the 
FDA‘s regulatory scheme.179 The FDA separately regulates prescription 
and over-the-counter (―OTC‖) drugs.180 Drugs requiring a physician‘s 
advice or prescription typically are perceived to carry greater risks to and 
potential for abuse by patients. Mere labeling cannot adequately protect 
patients.
181
 Drugs approved for OTC sale, by contrast, are deemed 
sufficiently safe for direct sale to patients, without an intermediary, as long 
 
 
(discussing Rutherford Court‘s ―holding that the same standards that apply to the general population of 
patients apply with equal force to terminal patients‖). 
 175. See Annas, supra note 85, at 779–80. 
 176. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486 (noting that ―the government‘s interest in Rutherford might 
well have been sufficiently compelling to warrant restricting access to the drug‖ but may be weaker in 
this case ―because the Alliance seeks only access to investigational new drugs that the FDA, after 
Phase I human trials, has deemed sufficiently safe for human testing on a substantial number of human 
beings‖). 
 177. Id. at 478. 
 178. Id. at 490–91 (Griffith, J., dissenting).  
 179. Id. at 472, 478. 
 180. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.100 (2008) (―Prescription drugs for human use‖), 201.66 (2008) 
(labeling requirements for OTC drugs); 21 C.F.R. §§ 330.1 (general requirements), 330.10 (2008) 
(―Procedures for classifying OTC drugs as generally recognized as safe and effective and not 
misbranded. . . .‖); see also Linda R. Horton, Over-the-Counter Drug Authority Issues: Selected 
Topics, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 545, 550–51 (1993) (suggesting that the FDA‘s ―new drug authority 
applies equally to prescription and OTC new drugs‖ but that ―legislators periodically have singled out 
prescription drugs for different attention: . . . for labeling and dispensing, advertising, inspection, 
marketing controls, and additional user charges‖); see generally HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 170, at 
588–99 (describing OTC drug regulation). 
 181. See Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from 
Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 427 (1982) (describing the FDA‘s 
justifications for prescription drug status but noting inconsistencies); Peter Temin, The Origin of 
Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 91, 98–99 (1979) (discussing presumptions 
underlying 1938 Act regarding consumers‘ abilities to understand drug ingredients and labeling). 
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as warnings and labels meet FDA requirements.
182
 Limiting the right of 
access to experimental drugs to those available on a doctor‘s advice, again, 
grounds the right in FDA rules. As with the Phase I limit, the recognized 
constitutional right could be altered or eliminated if the FDA alters its 
prescription or OTC regulatory scheme. More fundamentally, it is difficult 
to understand why the court would continue to insist on a physician 
intermediary to access the drugs when obstacles between the willing drug 
manufacturer and willing patient were precisely the Alliance‘s 
complaint—unless the court aims to protect patients from their own 
dangerous choices. 
Despite the panel‘s attempts to carefully contain the recognized right, 
its holding cannot be defended, as the en banc court ultimately concluded. 
Attempts to characterize the right varied throughout the opinion, belying 
the panel‘s apparent certainty in its conclusion. Initially, the court 
conceptualized a ―right of control over one‘s body,‖ analogizing to 
Cruzan,
183
 and later to Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey.
184
 The court buttressed 
the constitutional argument with reference to common-law privileges of 
self-defense, self-preservation, and private necessity.
185
 In framing its 
opinion, the court characterized a ―right to access potentially life-
sustaining medication,‖186 a ―right to make the decision about her life free 
from government interference,‖187 a ―right . . . to make an informed 
decision that may prolong life,‖188 a ―right . . . to choose to use [certain] 
drugs,‖189 or an ―individual right of self-determination.‖190 Each of those 
definitions fails to carefully, accurately frame the issue, as required by 
 
 
 182. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American 
Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 365–66 (2006) (explaining that ―virtually all‖ new drugs 
are available by prescription only and switched to OTC only after having ―survived not only [FDA‘s] 
rigorous premarket review process for new chemical entities but also the test of time and a second 
round of FDA scrutiny‖). 
 183. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 480; see also id. at 484 (―‗[N]o right is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person‘‖) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep‘t of Health, 496 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)). 
 184. Id. at 476, 481 n.12, 485 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (citing Casey‘s 
recognition that ―the Court has discerned the existence of fundamental rights by probing what 
‗personal dignity and autonomy‘ demand‖; ―[T]he right to be free from unwarranted government 
intrusion‖); Volokh, supra note 22, at 1824–27 (discussing right to medical self-defense and 
comparing Roe and Casey to Abigail Alliance). 
 185. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 480. 
 186. Id. at 472.  
 187. Id. at 472, 485 (―right of access‖ recognized ―in light of the explicit protection accorded to 
‗life‘‖).  
 188. Id. at 477. 
 189. Id. at 484. 
 190. Id. 
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Supreme Court precedent, and moreover fails to take into account other 
interests affected by recognizing the patients‘ asserted right. 
The Supreme Court‘s established test for identifying a derived 
fundamental right begins with a ―careful description‖ requirement.191 In 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court articulated a three-part test.
192
 The 
right must be ―deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition,‖ 
―implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,‖ and carefully described.193 The 
―careful description‖ requirement tends to direct the analysis of the other 
two requirements because one conceptualization of a right may be 
consistent with the ―[n]ation‘s history and tradition‖ and ―implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty‖ while another would not. For example, a 
constitutional challenge to laws prohibiting the use of medical marijuana, 
described as a ―right to use cannabis for medical purposes,‖ seems 
unlikely to be considered fundamental, whereas describing the right as a 
―right to preserve one‘s life or control one‘s body‖ does seem 
fundamental.
194
 Some critics suggest that the courts have morphed 
Glucksberg‘s ―careful description‖ requirement into a ―narrow 
description‖ requirement, with the effect (and arguably, purpose) of 
making it very difficult to recognize new fundamental rights.
195
 
Regardless, the ―careful description‖ makes all the difference to the 
court‘s recognition of a fundamental right, as the opinions and discussion 
demonstrate.
196
 
 
 
 191. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing cases); Randy E. Barnett, 
Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1489 (2008) (noting that ―a right must be ‗carefully defined‘ 
before a court can decide whether it is ‗deeply rooted‘‖). 
 192. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 476–77 (discussing 
Glucksberg fundamental rights analysis). 
 193. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (quotations omitted). 
 194. Compare United States v. Cannabis Cultivator‘s Club, No. C 98-00085 CRB, 1999 WL 
111893, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb 25, 1999) (declining to find ―fundamental right ‗to be free from 
governmental interdiction of their personal, self-funded medical choice, in consultation with their 
personal physician, to alleviate suffering through the only effective treatment available for them‘‖), 
and Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting constitutional right to 
obtain medication ―free of the lawful exercise of the government‘s police powers‖), with Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dep‘t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (―But for purposes of this case, we assume that 
the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.‖), and Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891) (recognizing ―right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others‖). 
 195. See Barnett, supra note 191, at 1488–93 (describing difficulty of rights being recognized as 
fundamental under Glucksberg test); Randy Barnett, Reefer Madness, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2007, at 
A13 (discussing Ninth Circuit medical marijuana decision). 
 196. See infra Part IV.A (evaluating various formulations of right). 
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Another line of reasoning with which the panel grappled 
unconvincingly was the relevance of FDA drug regulation in the second 
two prongs of the Glucksberg analysis: ―deeply rooted‖ and ―implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.‖ To rebut the plaintiff‘s assertion that a 
right to take drugs free from government interference was firmly rooted in 
the nation‘s traditions and history, the government pointed out the long-
standing history of FDA regulation.
197
 The panel noted, however, that the 
FDA has been in existence only since 1906, regulated drug safety only 
since 1938, and regulated drug efficacy only since 1962.
198
 According to 
the court, the right to unrestricted access to drugs is longer standing than 
government regulation of drugs.
199
 The court further found that the Abigail 
Alliance‘s claimed right ―also falls squarely within the realm of rights the 
Supreme Court has held are ‗implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.‘‖200 
The court therefore held that ―a terminally ill, mentally competent adult 
patient‘s informed access to potentially life-saving investigational new 
drugs determined by the FDA after Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for 
expanded human trials warrants protection under the Due Process 
Clause.‖201 The majority failed to acknowledge the awkwardness of 
simultaneously denying the relevance of FDA regulation when it came to 
the Glucksberg analysis, but then explicitly incorporating FDA regulatory 
requirements into the definition of the right. 
Having recognized a fundamental right, the panel remanded to the 
district court to apply the Due Process balancing test. On remand, the 
government would have had to meet a strict scrutiny standard, because of 
the fundamental nature of the right at issue, in establishing that ―FDA‘s 
policy barring access to post-Phase I investigational new drugs by 
terminally ill patients is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
 
 
 197. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 480 (quoting appellee‘s brief). 
 198. Id. at 481–83 (discussing history of FDA authority to regulate new drugs); see also 
Furmansky, supra note 94, at 109–10 (describing history and regulations of the FDA); Greenberg, 
supra note 99, at 302–05 (describing evolution of FDA regulation, with changes prompted by drug-
related public health crises, including elixir sulfanilamide, in 1938, and thalidomide, in early 1960s); 
Salbu, supra note 114, at 406–08 (noting same, and compassionate use exceptions prompted by 1980s 
AIDS crisis). 
 199. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 483 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 19, Abigail Alliance, 445 
F.3d 470 (No. 04-5350)) (―Despite the FDA‘s claim to the contrary, therefore, it cannot be said that 
government control of access to potentially life-saving medication ‗is now firmly ingrained in our 
understanding of the appropriate role of government.‘‖). But see id. at 494–95 (Griffith, J., dissenting) 
(discussing nation‘s longstanding history of drug regulation). 
 200. Id. at 483–84. 
 201. Id. at 486. 
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governmental interest.‖202 The case never reached the district court for 
reconsideration, however, because the en banc court reversed. 
2. En Banc Decision 
The en banc opinion, authored by Judge Griffith, the panel dissenter, 
reframed the issue, not as a personal autonomy right to control one‘s body, 
but as a right to access something currently inaccessible—drugs that the 
FDA has not approved for marketing.
203
 ―This case presents the question 
whether the Constitution provides terminally ill patients a right of access 
to experimental drugs that have passed limited safety trials but have not 
been proven safe and effective.‖204 On that question, the court concluded 
that ―the Alliance has not provided evidence of a right to procure and use 
experimental drugs that is deeply rooted in our Nation‘s history and 
traditions.‖205 The court rejected the Abigail Alliance‘s suggestion that the 
only question was drug efficacy, not safety, noting that all three (and 
sometimes four) Phases of FDA new drug approval address safety.
206
  
The ongoing relevance of safety testing, even after Phase I, supported 
the en banc court‘s conclusion that unregulated access to experimental 
drugs was not firmly rooted in the nation‘s history and tradition. The 
FDA‘s regulation of drug safety, in particular, has been in place at least 
thirty years longer than regulation of drug efficacy.
207
 In any event, 
although the FDA may be a relatively new federal agency, state and 
federal regulation of drugs dated back to the colonies.
208
 Moreover, the 
court acknowledged the difficulty of defining a fundamental right based 
on a regulatory scheme, when Congress or the FDA at any time could 
 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
 204. Id. (describing plaintiff‘s issue). 
 205. Id. at 711. 
 206. Id. at 698 & n.2 (―Clinical testing for safety and effectiveness requires three or sometimes 
four phases,‖ including Phase IV, sometimes conducted to develop ―additional information about the 
drug‘s risks, benefits, and optimal use.‖) (quotations omitted); id. at 708 (―The Alliance seeks access 
to drugs that are experimental and have not been shown to be safe, let alone effective at . . . prolonging 
life.‖). 
 207. Id. at 703 (―The Alliance‘s efforts to focus on efficacy regulation ignored one simple fact: it 
is unlawful for the Alliance to procure experimental drugs not only because they have not been proven 
effective, but because they have not been proven safe.‖). 
 208. Id. at 703–06 (beginning with the Colony of Virginia‘s 1736 act addressing ―dispensing of 
more drugs than was ‗necessary or useful‘ because that practice had become ‗dangerous and 
intolerable‘‖) (citation omitted). 
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amend the statute or rules, just as the FDA recently proposed in 
liberalizing access to experimental drugs: 
How can a constitutional right be defined by an administrative 
regulation that is subject to change? . . . [W]e find it difficult to 
imagine how a right inextricably entangled with the details of 
shifting administrative regulations could be ―deeply rooted in this 
Nation‘s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.‖209 
Specifically, the court rejected the Abigail Alliance‘s attempt to 
distinguish an asserted constitutional right to drugs deemed ―safe‖ but not 
necessarily effective, from a right to access drugs that may not be safe—
that is, drugs that have not passed Phase I.
210
 The long history of 
government activity in medical and drug regulation
211
 undermined the 
Abigail Alliance‘s contention that ―the government never interfered with 
the judgment of individual doctors about the medical efficacy of particular 
drugs until 1962.‖212 The court further noted consistent rejection of similar 
challenges to the FDA‘s authority to regulate access to drugs, including 
Rutherford in 1979 and recent medical marijuana cases.
213
 Moreover, no 
circuit courts have recognized an ―affirmative access claim‖ to particular 
medical treatments that the government restricts or regulates.
214
 
The en banc court also rejected the Alliance‘s reliance on common law 
doctrines of necessity, intentional interference with rescue, and self-
defense to support the claim of a fundamental right. Unable to deny the 
long-standing recognition of those judicial doctrines, the court noted 
 
 
 209. Id. at 702 n.6 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (quotations 
omitted); see also id. at 710 n.17 (discussing FDA regulation, prior judicial challenges, and suggesting 
that political branches are better suited than courts to address the Abigail Alliance‘s concerns); see, 
e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34 (―Treatment use‖), 314.36 (―Emergency use‖) (2008); Expanded Access to 
Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 210. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703.  
 211. Id. at 703 n.7, 704 (tracing history of drug regulation in England, beginning in 1447); id. at 
706 & n.12 (discussing history of government regulation of scientific, mathematical, and medical 
advances). 
 212. Id. at 703 (citation and emphasis omitted). 
 213. See id. at 708–10 (citing cases rejecting statutory, if not constitutional, challenges to the 
FDA‘s authority); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding constitutionality of federal 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) over challenge by California marijuana users and makers); United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers‘ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (rejecting claimed implied medical 
necessity exception to federal CSA). 
 214. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710 n.18; see Hill, supra note 23, at 303–04 (discussing 
Rutherford, Whalen v. Roe, and other cases examining right to make medical treatment decisions). 
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multiple exceptions and limitations on their application.
215
 The necessity 
defense failed to override the government‘s interest in regulating 
marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act.
216
 The interference with 
rescue claim requires proof that a third party was prevented from giving 
necessary assistance to the victim. According to the court, the ―necessity‖ 
element was not met on the Abigail Alliance facts because the patients had 
not demonstrated that experimental drugs were safe, much less effective, 
in prolonging their lives.
217
 Therefore, there was no interference with 
―necessary‖ rescue. The self-defense claim was not apt because patients‘ 
taking of experimental drugs was not analogous to their using reasonable 
force against an aggressor to defend themselves from immediate bodily 
harm.
218
 Accordingly, none of the common law claims supported the 
claimed fundamental right.
219
 
The panel majority, Chief Judge Ginsburg and Judge Rogers, now 
writing the en banc dissent, faulted the court‘s opinion for ―reflect[ing] a 
flawed conception of the right.‖220 Judges Ginsburg and Rogers here 
framed the purported right even more broadly than in their panel opinion. 
They described the Abigail Alliance‘s argument as not merely the right to 
use, obtain, decide, or self-determine, but the ―right of a person to save her 
own life,‖ which they concluded is certainly firmly rooted in the nation‘s 
history and tradition—beginning with Samuel Adams, Blackstone, and 
others who recognized the right of self-preservation as the ―first law of 
nature‖ or ―principal or primary‖ rights.221 So framed, it is much harder to 
argue that the right is not firmly rooted or implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. But the dissent‘s description is certainly not ―narrow‖ and 
arguably not ―careful.‖ More accurately, the Abigail Alliance asked the 
court to recognize a right to obtain, from a third party who may or may not 
be willing to provide, through at least two additional layers of regulatory 
oversight, a drug that suggests some hope but no promise of alleviating 
symptoms and of prolonging or saving their lives. 
 
 
 215. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 707. 
 216. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006); see Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 708 (discussing Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers‟ Coop., 532 U.S. at 490–91). 
 217. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 708–09. 
 218. Id. at 709–10. The court distinguished Abigail Alliance‘s claim from abortion to save the life 
of the mother, a better example of medical self-defense. See also Volokh, supra note 22, at 1824–28 
(discussing analogies). But see Snead, supra note 145, at 1 (refuting abortion and self-defense 
analogies). 
 219. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 711. 
 220. Id. at 714 (Rogers & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
 221. Id. at 714, 717; see id. at 701 n.5 (suggesting that ―dissent has recast the Alliance‘s proposed 
right . . . into a right ‗to try to save one‘s life‘‖). 
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With respect to the common law doctrines, the dissent properly 
criticized the court for prematurely delving into the issue of the 
government‘s justification for interfering with the right, fundamental or 
otherwise. That balancing test would be the issue on remand to the district 
court, had the panel decision stood.
222
 The court should not have reached 
that issue without first clearly resolving the threshold question of whether 
the fundamental right exists in the first place.
223
 Indeed, the majority 
conflated its consideration of the common law theories by asserting that 
the government could limit those rights, with proper justification.
224
 That 
common law privileges or protections for personal autonomy are not 
absolute and subject to exceptions does not disprove their existence as 
rights.
225
 The en banc‘s approach is the easy way out. It is not difficult to 
recognize that, in many cases, the FDA has good reasons for limiting 
individual rights and restricting access to drugs that may not be safe or 
effective. But the government‘s justification was not yet ripe before the 
D.C. Circuit.
226
 Even under strict scrutiny, the FDA‘s new drug approval 
process and restrictions on access to particular medical treatments likely 
would be upheld, as they had been under other challenges.
227
 
In its petition for certiorari, the Abigail Alliance sought due process 
recognition of ―the right of a terminally ill patient . . . to attempt to save 
her own life by deciding . . . whether to seek access to‖ experimental drugs 
that the FDA deems ―safe and promising enough for substantial human 
testing.‖228 The government‘s brief in opposition framed the issue as 
―[w]hether terminally ill patients who lack alternative treatment options 
have a constitutional right to purchase unapproved investigational drugs 
that have not been shown to be safe or effective and that have not been 
authorized for treatment uses by the Food and Drug Administration.‖229 
 
 
 222. See supra text accompanying note 202 (citing panel‘s instructions on remand). 
 223. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 714. 
 224. See id. at 707. 
 225. See id. at 708–10; see also Snead, supra note 145, at 1 (rejecting analogies, in part, because 
―the government [has] routinely restrict[ed] the instrumentalities of self-help in the name of avoiding 
what it takes to be more significant harms‖). 
 226. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 
F.3d 470, 486 (2006) (remanding to district court); id. at 477 (describing strict scrutiny test); see also 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993); 
Volokh, supra note 22, at 1837 (acknowledging that medical self-defense right may have limits and 
noting remand to determine ―whether the FDA rules were narrowly tailored to some compelling 
government interest‖). 
 227. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710–11 n.18 (citing cases). 
 228. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008) (Mem.) (No. 07-444), 2007 WL 2846053, at *i. 
 229. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 3, Abigail Alliance, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (No. 07-444), 
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The Supreme Court summarily denied review, letting the en banc decision 
stand.
230
 Unless other litigants renew the claim on new facts—likely 
before the D.C. Circuit, where the issue has been amply considered and 
reconsidered—the en banc decision remains the final judicial word on the 
proposed fundamental, constitutional right of access to experimental 
treatment. 
So, what next? Bills are pending in both the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate. The FDA‘s proposed rules are still 
forthcoming. Public pressure to expand access to experimental drugs 
continues to mount. What is the ―right‖ at stake, if not a fundamental, 
constitutional right for patients? The next Part considers other, possible 
ways of thinking about the rights implicated, urging that the public health 
right should take precedence. Brief consideration of the public health right 
in relation to other recent policy debates concludes this Article. 
IV. THE PUBLIC HEALTH RIGHT 
After the Abigail Alliance dust settled, we are left with the correct 
decision and unremarkable declaration that there is no fundamental, 
constitutional, substantive due process right for terminally ill patients to 
obtain drugs that have passed only Phase I of the FDA‘s new drug 
approval process. But the court‘s reasoning is less than satisfying. 
Reframing the issue and considering the various players‘ interests points 
to the public health right as a better way to support the conclusion. 
Whether the public health right can rationally be invoked to justify other 
recent regulations that impinge on individual rights remains ripe for 
discussion. 
A. Redefining the Right 
The en banc court ultimately declined to recognize a ―right of access‖ 
to drugs that have begun the FDA‘s new drug approval process but are not 
yet deemed safe and effective. The panel recognized a ―right to control 
one‘s body,‖ relying on Cruzan and Casey.231 But Cruzan is inapposite 
because freedom from having things done to one‘s body is not the same as 
an affirmative right to ingest something into one‘s body. A negative right 
to be free from government interference is distinct from an affirmative 
 
 
2007 WL 4458896, at *1. 
 230. Abigail Alliance, 128 S. Ct. 1069. 
 231. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 472, 476, 479, 484. 
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right to property, privileges, and protection from the government.
232
 
Similarly, saying that government cannot do things that cause injury or 
inflict harm on individual members of society is not the same as saying 
that government must ensure a healthy state of being or access to health 
care.
233
 
It may be difficult to deny the right of an individual to ingest 
ineffective, even harmful drugs, other than on paternalistic grounds of 
preventing harm to the individual. If we respect people‘s liberty to know 
what is in their own best interest, then surely they should be allowed to 
take the drug.
234
 When the person is dying and has nothing to lose, the 
claim seems even harder to deny.
235
 Indeed, the panel drew just that 
distinction, limiting the recognized right to terminally ill patients who had 
exhausted all other options. But the court did not explain the distinction. 
Why should patients who seek access to potentially life-saving drugs have 
any greater right than patients who seek access to potentially life-
enhancing drugs? Why should nonterminal patients not be given the same 
freedom to control their bodies? If anything, it seems that dying patients 
warrant greater government protection, given their desperate state and 
potential for impaired judgment and improper influence.
236
 
 
 
 232. See Parmet, supra note 29, at 271–77, 304–06 (questioning conventional assumption that 
U.S. constitutional law primarily supports negative—not positive—rights, and discussing implications 
for public health). 
 233. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (holding 
no substantive due process violation for harm to a foster child by foster parent because ―nothing in the 
language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of 
its citizens against invasion by private actors‖); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text 
(distinguishing ―right to health‖ and ―public health right‖). 
 234. See Epstein, supra note 34, at 758–59 (―The presumptions here should be set strongly in 
favor of allowing individuals to continue to take those drugs of choice even as other individuals, quite 
properly, decide to follow the opposite course of action.‖); Furmansky, supra note 94, at 108 
(beginning with popular view, but ultimately debunking it: ―The appeal of this view is obvious. Why 
shouldn‘t someone who is dying anyway be given the choice to assume the responsibility and risk of 
making the decision to try a drug that has not passed extensive testing in humans?‖); see also Brief for 
the Respondent‘s at 42–43, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers‘ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) 
(No. 00-151), 2001 WL 173541, at *42–43 (―[T]hese patients have a fundamental right to be free from 
government interdiction of their personal self-funded medical decision, in consultation with their 
physician, to alleviate their suffering through the only alternative available to them.‖). But see Volokh, 
supra note 22, at 1828–29 (suggesting that terminally ill patients should have a ―right to ingest 
potentially lifesaving medicines without threatening anyone else‘s life‖ but that ―[t]his is not a general 
autonomy argument, premised on the theory that all people should be free to put whatever they choose 
into their bodies,‖ and offering medical self-defense as alternate rationale). 
 235. See Annas, supra note 103, at 408 (quoting National Cancer Institute spokesperson about 
calls to hotline, pleading access to drugs: ―What the callers are saying is, ‗Our mother, our brother, our 
sister is dying at this very moment. We have nothing to lose.‘‖). 
 236. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1979) (rejecting suggestion that 
―Congress could reasonably have determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than other patients, 
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At the same time, the panel bought into certain patient-protective 
controls, even for dying patients, under the FDA‘s regulatory scheme.237 
First, the court allowed access only to drugs that passed Phase I, which the 
panel took to be conclusively safe. Apparently dying patients may incur 
the risks of drugs that might not work effectively, but not drugs that might 
harm or kill them. Second, the court required a physician intermediary 
between the patient and pharmaceutical company. The court trusted 
patients to know their own best interests—to a point. They may access 
investigational drugs only after a conversation with their doctors. Why not 
allow OTC access to investigational drugs? If the issue was that the FDA 
alone was standing in the way of patients‘ fundamental right to life, then it 
is hard to accept the panel‘s insistence on leaving some FDA paternalistic 
controls in place.
238
 
Another difficulty with the ―right to use‖ or ―right of control over one‘s 
body‖ line of reasoning is that the patients asserted a right to ingest 
substances not in their possession or publicly available. They could not 
grow the drugs themselves, like they could marijuana, or otherwise 
possess or obtain them without involving another party.
239
 Rather, the 
 
 
from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise‖); Jacobson & Parmet, 
supra note 72, at 207 (―As the government argued to the panel, terminally ill patients are particularly 
vulnerable to promises that unproven treatments will be effective.‖). 
 237. As discussed above, precedent compelled the court to conclude that the FDA‘s authority was 
no different for terminal and nonterminal patients. See supra notes 94–96; see also Rutherford, 442 
U.S. at 553. 
 238. See Epstein, supra note 34, at 747–48 (concluding that the FDA‘s ―entire effort to make 
better judgments on what treatments should be used and why smacks of an unthinking paternalism,‖ 
instead urging ―downstream, not upstream‖ controls by allowing products to reach the market and 
individual users to decide); Leaf, supra note 105 (discussing ―how our national obsession with drug 
safety is killing people‖); Henry I. Miller, Paternalism Costs Lives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at A14.  
 One commentator distinguishes ―hard‖ and ―soft‖ paternalism in public health. ―Hard‖ 
paternalism leaves the individual with no choice at all about engaging in risky conduct, for example, 
mandatory helmet laws. ―Soft paternalism legitimizes intervention . . . where the individual‘s decision 
to engage in that conduct is not factually informed, not adequately understood, coerced, or otherwise 
substantially cognitively or volitionally impaired.‖ Requiring prescriptions for drugs is ―soft‖ 
paternalism because the patient lacks information to make a fully autonomous decision. See Thaddeus 
Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel Feinberg, 30 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 122–23 & n.3 (2005) (analyzing JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1986)). 
 239. The court made a similar observation in Carnohan, regarding Laetrile. See Carnohan v. 
United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (―We need not decide whether Carnohan has a 
constitutional right to treat himself with home remedies of his own confection.‖); United States v. 
Cannabis Cultivator‘s Club, No. C 98-00085 CRB, 1999 WL 111893, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb 25, 1999) 
(not deciding whether patients ―have a right to treat themselves with marijuana which they themselves 
grow‖ because Carnohan holds no right to obtain); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) 
(rejecting argument that police power does not extend to regulating citizen‘s manufacturing beer for 
his own use because public health, public morals, and public safety nevertheless may be endangered). 
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drugs they wanted to take were developed under patent protection by 
pharmaceutical companies. In order to exercise the personal autonomy 
right, a patient would necessarily have to involve a third party—the drug 
company. 
Accordingly, the panel dissent and en banc court conceived of a ―right 
to access‖ or ―right to obtain‖ the drugs that is arguably more accurate.240 
As Judge Griffith urged: ―[A] tradition [of] protecting individual freedom 
from life-saving, but forced, medical treatment does not evidence a 
constitutional tradition of providing affirmative access to a potentially 
harmful, and even fatal, commercial good.‖241 The panel simplified the 
question by assuming a willing drug company, willing patient, and willing 
physician. Accordingly, there was no issue of compelling or requiring 
access to the drug. But what if the manufacturer did not want to sell its 
experimental drug or lacked production capacity to meet demands? As a 
necessary corollary of the right to access or obtain drugs, would the 
government require drug companies to sell their investigational drugs to 
terminally ill patients? One might counter that recognizing a right to 
abortion does not compel a doctor to perform the procedure,
242
 a 
pharmacist to prescribe the morning-after pill,
243
 or the government to pay 
for abortions.
244
 But those examples are distinguishable, as long as there is 
another avenue for exercising the right.
245
 With experimental drugs, there 
usually is no other way to get the drugs. 
 
 
 240. See generally Carnohan, 616 F.2d 1120; Cannabis Cultivator‟s Club, No. C 98-00085 CRB, 
1999 WL 111893. 
 241. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470, 495 (2006) (Carth, J., dissenting). 
 242. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000) (providing that receipt of certain federal funds does not 
require ―such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure or 
abortion if his performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion would be 
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions‖); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (2007) (―[A]ny 
person who states in writing an objection to any abortion or all abortions on moral or religious grounds 
shall not be required to participate in procedures which will result in such abortion; and the refusal of 
the person to participate therein shall not form the basis of any claim for damages on account of such 
refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory action against the person.‖). 
 243. See Tom C. W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy Conscience: A Prescription for Medical 
Conscience Clauses, 31 VT. L. REV. 105 (2006); Jennifer E. Spreng, Pharmacists and the “Duty” to 
Dispense Emergency Contraceptives, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 215 (2008); Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, 
The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency 
Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2009 (2004). 
 244. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (state Medicaid programs are not required to pay 
for abortions); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
 245. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (state ban on abortions in 
public hospitals was not unconstitutional because patients could still obtain abortions from private 
providers). 
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Experimental drugs, by regulatory design, are in the sole, patented 
protection of the company that develops them.
246
 If that company‘s drug is 
the one that a patient wants, the one to which she has a fundamental 
constitutional right, how else can she exercise the right except by 
compelling the company to hand it over? Perhaps the patient could obtain 
an injunction, requiring the company to give or sell the drug. Or perhaps 
the government would exercise some form of personal property eminent 
domain to seize the drugs for the benefit of terminally ill patients. In the 
real property context, the Court has upheld a compelled transfer from one 
private party to another when it benefited the public.
247
 At least one court, 
however, expressly rejected chronically ill patients‘ claim to compel a 
drug company to provide them with investigational drugs.  
A Sixth Circuit case, Abney v. Amgen,
248
 involved Parkinson‘s drug 
trials, which the manufacturer and trials sponsor, Amgen, called off before 
they were completed. Patients enrolled in the trials, who believed they had 
experienced marked improvement from the investigational drugs, sued 
Amgen on state law theories, including breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and detrimental reliance, to compel access to the drugs.
249
 
Amgen claimed that it ceased the trials because of safety concerns.
250
 The 
patients suspected that they stopped because the product would not be 
lucrative.
251
 If we respect the pharmaceutical company‘s fundamental 
property rights, its reasons for ceasing the trials should not be relevant to 
the analysis.
252
 The court rejected all of the plaintiffs‘ common law claims, 
finding no contractual or other binding obligation on the drug company—
in other words, no ―right‖ for the patients to obtain the drugs against the 
manufacturer‘s willingness to provide or sell them.253 Any other result 
 
 
 246. See Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and 
Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 109–25 (2005) (making case for pharmaceutical 
patents); Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to 
Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-Pharmaceutical Companies?, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 647, 648–50 (2008) (suggesting that only 40% of pharmaceutical inventions would be 
developed without patent protection, compared to 86% for inventions in general, and describing 
operation of and incentives underlying U.S. patent system for pharmaceuticals). 
 247. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 248. 443 F.3d 540 (2006). 
 249. See id. at 545 (listing claims); see also Epstein, supra note 34, at 757 (describing scenario 
and ―howls of protests from unhappy patients‖). 
 250. Abney, 443 F.3d at 544. 
 251. See id. at 545. 
 252. See Epstein, supra note 34, at 758 (―And there is, in my view, no duty for [Amgen] to invest 
further in a drug that may promise them the unhappy trifecta of small markets, lagging profitability, 
and high liability exposure.‖). But see Anand, supra note 74 (describing outrage that drug company 
failed to provide drugs to dying children, believing profit motivations). 
 253. Abney, 443 F.3d at 553 (affirming district court‘s denial of preliminary injunction). 
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would seem to violate the manufacturer‘s right to exclusive enjoyment of 
its intellectual and personal property.
254
  
Maybe the patients‘ right to obtain drugs could be justified on a 
hierarchy of rights, according to which the right to life trumps the right to 
property. Who could argue that the ―greedy‖ pharmaceutical company‘s 
interests are more important than patients‘ right to obtain potentially life-
prolonging treatment?
255
 There is support for the argument that life trumps 
property in common law self-defense
256
 and necessity doctrines.
257
 The 
question becomes more complicated when the pharmaceutical company 
acts out of concern for safety, pulling the drugs based on adverse events. 
The debate is no longer over life versus property, but relative degrees of 
risk and safety and who decides whether patients should be permitted to 
encounter the risks.
258
 
That debate suggests another way to reframe the issue. Maybe the 
balance is not life versus property, but life versus lives. Does the 
possibility of saving the life of one, or a few, terminally ill patients, by 
giving them access to an experimental drug now, outweigh the interests of 
countless future lives potentially saved or enhanced if the drug undergoes 
all three phases of ―gold standard‖ clinical trials before it is made available 
to the public? The examples discussed above—nonexistent, rushed, 
abbreviated, incomplete, and nonrandomized clinical trials
259—
demonstrate the value of the scientific method and rigorous new drug 
approval process, for both current and future patients who may take the 
drug. Even clinical trials on drugs that are denied approval or are pulled 
 
 
 254. Patent law grants an innovator ―the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
States‖ for a limited term of years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006); see Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (indicating that a patent gives the inventor the right to exclude 
others from profit from that invention, and citing cases). 
 255. See Furmansky, supra note 94, at 108 (―Ask any ten people in the street whether terminal 
patients, destined to die . . . should be allowed access to investigational drugs . . . . An overwhelming 
majority will say yes.‖); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, How Companies Stall Generics 
And Keep Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at 1 (quoting Hatch-Waxman Act drafter 
on pharmaceutical companies‘ delay tactics to extend patent protection: ―It‘s the evolution of greed 
versus need.‖). 
 256. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (denying self-defense claim for use 
of deadly force by spring-loaded gun to defend unoccupied building and antique mason jars). 
 257. See, e.g., Putnam v. Ploof, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (holding property owner liable for damage to 
boat, where owner moored out of necessity without permission during sudden tempest). 
 258. Compare Epstein, supra note 34, at 757 (suggesting that patients should choose), with Annas, 
supra note 85, at 792 (suggesting that the FDA should choose). 
 259. See supra notes 116–48 and accompanying text (describing scenarios involving DES, 
ABMT/HDC, AZT, BiDil, and other drugs). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
  
 
 
 
 
2009] THE PUBLIC‘S RIGHT TO HEALTH 1383 
 
 
 
 
before all three Phases are completed—as most are260—may produce 
scientific data useful for developing other treatments. The research subject 
enrollment and random sampling problems would be exacerbated if 
patients could obtain potentially life-saving drugs without enrolling in 
trials and risking placebos or conventional treatment. Who would be left in 
the trials?
261
 
It is disingenuous to argue that some risk-adverse patients might prefer 
to wait for drugs to be fully tested before taking them when that was 
precisely the complaint of the terminally ill plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance: 
they would literally die waiting.
262
 Therefore, preapproval marketing 
removes a potentially significant set of data from the safety and efficacy 
trials, undermining the whole process.
263
 How can we justify allowing the 
rights of a few dying patients to deny the rights of countless others who 
also have the disease, or may develop it sometime in the future, to benefit 
from the scientific knowledge gained by studying the drugs? That 
 
 
 260. Thirty percent of drugs are deemed too dangerous to pass beyond Phase I, and only one-third 
of drugs that pass Phase I complete Phase III. See Furmansky, supra note 94, at 110. For cancer drugs, 
only five percent of drugs approved for human trials are approved for patient use. See Jacobson & 
Parmet, supra note 72, at 206 (listing safety, efficacy, and financial concerns as reasons for 
abandonment). 
 261. See Kovatis, supra note 94, at 166 (―It would also be difficult to recruit patients for clinical 
trials if they can obtain the drugs from their own doctors without the restrictions and red tape of a 
clinical trial.‖); Groopman, supra note 72, at 47 (noting that expanded access would make it difficult 
to recruit patients for trials, for ―what patient would want to risk receiving the standard treatment in a 
trial when he could get the experimental drug directly from his doctor?‖). Real-world evidence, 
especially AZT trials, refutes hypothetical speculation that sufficient numbers of patients will 
nevertheless enroll and that, therefore, the ―need-to-test‖ does not justify stripping the individual‘s 
right of medical self-defense. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text; Volokh, supra note 22, 
at 1829–30 (refuting ―need-to-test‖ argument). 
 262. One commentator‘s response to the concern that no patients would enroll in clinical trials 
notes theoretically that ―variance in risk assessment,‖ ―hope or faith,‖ and ―altruism‖ may influence 
some patients to enroll. Salbu, supra note 114, at 433. That argument is also unconvincing given the 
overwhelming anecdotal descriptions of terminally ill patients‘ desperate situations. Salbu, supra note 
114, at 427–33. ―Variance in financial resources‖ and financial incentives for clinical trial participation 
is offered as another way to ensure enrollment. Id. at 433–34. Paid research subjects and variance in 
financial resources only exacerbate the public health harms. See supra notes 137–38. 
 263. See Soc‘y of Clinical Trials, supra note 80, at 155 (noting that ―the most reliable data . . . is 
that obtained from prospective randomized clinical trials‖); Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 72, at 206–
07 (―Without random assignment of patients to receive either the new drug or a placebo or comparator 
drug, the true efficacy and adverse-event profile of an investigational drug will be unknown.‖). Some 
commentators argue that usable information about drugs could be obtained from expanded access to 
drugs, outside of controlled clinical trials. See Salbu, supra note 114, at 432 (suggesting ―informal 
observations‖ and word of mouth will enhance information gathering because ―drugs will be 
consumed more quickly‖); Leibfarth, supra note 99, at 1306 (―Although feedback from individual 
patients may not provide quantitative data, it may produce both research strategies and hypotheses for 
further study.‖). 
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conception of the Abigail Alliance issue approaches the concept of the 
public health right, as explained more fully in the next Part.  
B. The Public Health Right 
The public health right contemplates that the public, as a body, merits 
protection from interference by individual members of society. In the case 
of access to experimental drugs, the potential harm to so many other 
patients who also await the promise of a cure or benefit from scientific 
developments, justifies the decision to deny access to experimental drugs 
to currently terminally ill patients. The public health right, as used here, is 
distinct from the ―right to health‖ because it does not aim to ensure an 
affirmative right to access health-care services, health protection, or 
aspirational standards of health for individuals.
264 
The public health right is 
grounded in the ―old‖ public health, which aims at collective action 
problems, not the ―new‖ public health, which aims broadly to ensure the 
―underlying determinants‖ for people to be healthy.265 
Rather, the public health right, like the individual autonomy right relied 
on by the Abigail Alliance plaintiffs and the panel, is a negative right to be 
protected from interference by the exercise of others‘ rights. The 
competing uses are not one individual versus another, but select 
individuals versus the body politic. As in any other unresolvable 
competing uses conflict, the government typically referees the dispute and 
decides which right prevails.
266
 Here, the en banc D.C. Circuit, without 
using these terms, ruled in favor of the public against the individual 
patients. Strong emphasis should be placed on the qualifying word 
―unresolvable‖ because the dispute between patients‘ interest in taking 
experimental drugs and the public‘s interest in pharmaceutical research is 
not amenable to private resolution.
267
 Accepting the en banc court‘s 
 
 
 264. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (distinguishing ―public health right‖ and ―right to 
health‖). Accordingly, this Article‘s reference to the ―public health right‖ must be distinguished from 
the term‘s use by other commentators who begin with the assumption that there is an individual right 
to health and propose the ―public health right‖ as a way to collectively ensure the individual right. See, 
e.g., Meier & Mori, supra note 15, at 137 (―If individuals are bearers of a human right to health, 
societies then become the only possible bearers of a collective right to public health, with the 
collective right necessary to fulfill the individual right.‖); Ruger, supra note 15, at 44, 48 (describing 
the ―right to health as an ethical demand for equity in health,‖ depending on ―societal obligations, both 
State and non-state, for progressive realization of this right‖). 
 265. Meier & Mori, supra note 15, at 123 (citing Lawrence Gostin). 
 266. See, e.g., supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text (discussing city sanitation example). 
 267. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1423 (traditional public health interventions justified for 
problems that ―do not lend themselves effectively to either market solutions or to private actions in 
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decision denying their right, the patients have already shown that litigation 
is ineffective. Their case remains dismissed for failing to identify an 
enforceable legal right. Likewise, market solutions do not seem to help 
them secure their asserted right, short of buying experimental drugs on the 
gray market, like many AIDS patients in the past.
268
 And it is hard to 
envision what contract they could offer to the public to give up its public 
health right. 
To return to the familiar analogy, allowing access to drugs before full 
clinical trials depletes the ―commons‖ of the scientific process for 
developing new drugs by allowing ―overgrazing‖ by a few justifiably 
desperate and terminally ill patients.
269
 As discussed, one individual‘s 
decision to ingest a particular drug affects far greater interests than his or 
her own bodily integrity.
270
 Taking an experimental drug is more akin to 
avoiding vaccination than avoiding sunscreen.
271
 Unlike the sunscreen 
analogy, whereby one sunbather‘s decision to go bare leaves another 
person‘s choice to wear sun block unimpaired, Abigail‘s decision to 
expose herself to the risk of untested drugs imposes harm on the public‘s 
interest in having drugs scientifically studied. One individual‘s decision to 
avoid vaccination might have a negligible effect on public health, but the 
cumulative effect of more and more people opting out of vaccinations 
undermines ―herd immunity‖ and erodes the commons of a disease-free 
society.
272
 Similarly, the cumulative effect of more and more people 
opting in for early access to investigational drugs erodes the commons of 
―scientific research on the efficacy of pharmaceuticals.‖273 Scientific 
knowledge and medical research is a public good in the sense that no 
individual has the capacity to produce it without collective action, just as 
my neighbors and I cannot secure a sanitary city on our own.
274
 Moreover, 
the benefits of scientific research inure not just to me but to the public (the 
body politic). In other words, expanded access to experimental drugs is a 
 
 
tort‖); Annas, supra note 85, at 795 (―Experimental drugs are not a consumer good appropriately 
governed by the free market.‖). 
 268. See supra notes 109, 128 (describing patients‘ resourcefulness in securing drugs). 
 269. See Ruger, supra note 15, at 50. 
 270. But see Epstein, supra note 34, at 758–59 (―The decision to ingest a given drug is the polar 
opposite of any public goods or collective action problem that might call for state intervention.‖). 
 271. See supra notes 48–51 (drawing analogies). 
 272. See supra notes 43–47 (describing ―Tragedy of the Commons‖ concept and vaccine analogy). 
 273. See supra note 47 (discussing recent trend of parents opting out of mandatory vaccination). 
 274. See Ruger, supra note 15, at 50; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at 1434 (defining public good 
as ―a good which has to be supplied to all if it is to be supplied to even one‖). The public good at issue 
is deliberately identified as scientific knowledge and research, not the pharmaceutical products 
themselves, which are expressly protected as private monopolies under patents. See supra notes 246, 
254 (regarding pharmaceutical patent laws). 
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―public bad‖ in the sense that the public is deprived of its choice to 
investigate drugs fully.
275
  
Restricting access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients is 
justified by the public health right, but not on the paternalistic grounds that 
many suggest is the basis for the FDA‘s regulatory authority.276 The public 
health right recognizes an interest in fully testing pharmaceutical products, 
beyond preventing patients from wasting money and endangering their 
health by purchasing ―snake oils.‖ The objective is not merely protecting 
patients from their own bad decision to consume potentially harmful, or 
merely expensive and useless, drugs. Nor is it simply a matter of the 
Abigail Alliance plaintiffs hypothetically preferring to risk skin cancer 
while leaving the public free to apply sunscreen before going outside. As a 
practical matter, the public cannot secure its right without restricting 
access to experimental drugs.
277
 
Does the public health right really justify relegating dying patients to 
the status of research guinea pigs so that the public might possibly enjoy 
some medical benefit in the future? Does the public‘s interest in cold 
science outweigh human compassion for dying patients? We must 
conclude: Yes. There is no suggestion that the principle goal of the FDA 
new drug approval process or of accepted clinical research standards is 
treatment rather than science.
278
 The response is not as draconian as 
suggested; the FDA does allow access to experimental drugs under narrow 
―compassionate use‖ and ―emergency‖ exceptions.279 Moreover, well-
 
 
 275. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1426 (―In contrast to public goods, public bads are inflicted 
upon others without their consent, as are communicable diseases and pollution, but not obesity or 
genetic diseases.‖). 
 276. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 85, at 792 (justifying the FDA new drug approval process 
because ―the public is in no position to judge the value or usefulness of many medications‖); Salbu, 
supra note 114, at 418–20 (critiquing the FDA‘s ―paternalistic model‖ of drug testing and approval). 
See generally Epstein, supra note 34; Cole, supra note 18, at 80–81 (describing paternalistic 
justification for public health interventions); Pope, supra note 238, at 121 (evaluating same).  
 277. See Cole, supra note 18, at 81 (suggesting that ―correct justification‖ for immunization is 
paternalism unless ―immunization of one person will protect others who cannot, as a practical matter, 
protect themselves‖). 
 278. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text (noting patients‘ and researchers‘ competing 
objectives); Annas, supra note 85, at 773 (―Perhaps the major source of controversy surrounding 
[AIDS drug trials] is that the investigators see these trials as research designed to provide 
generalizable knowledge that may help others, while most individuals suffering with AIDS see these 
trials as therapy designed to benefit them.‖). 
 279. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34 (―Treatment use‖), 314.36 (―Emergency use‖) (2008); Expanded 
Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
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developed ethical rules and guidelines protect human subjects in clinical 
research.
280
  
The outcome still may seem harsh. Under the social contract model, do 
the benefits of joining society really outweigh the price of being denied 
access to potentially life-saving treatment and being ―used‖ for scientific 
study? Choosing to remain a member of society and enjoying its other 
protections may require compromising some individual interests,
281
 but is 
this too much? The question is a straw man because there is no natural 
―right‖ to experimental drugs with which government is interfering. The 
patients seek more than simply a self-executing ―right to life,‖ right to 
avoid having something done to one‘s body like Cruzan, or ―right to be 
left alone.‖282 Rather, they seek access to something that they cannot 
produce themselves and that belongs to other members of society. Having 
already distinguished the individual right to health from the public health 
right, the argument that joining society affirmatively entitles members to 
health, health care, and access to investigational drugs is unavailing. 
The public health right also is not based on the ―conserving common 
resources‖ rationale that may sometimes support seat belt, helmet, and 
hypothetical obesity or mandatory sunscreen laws.
283
 Under that view, the 
individual choice to avoid wearing a safety device, eat unhealthy foods 
containing trans fats, or go out without sun block imposes costs on the rest 
of society by increasing overall health care expenditures. That argument 
assumes that society will care for the brain injury, melanoma, diabetes, 
heart disease, or broken limbs. Otherwise, no cost is imposed on society 
from those individual bad choices. The case of experimental drugs is 
different. Allowing patients to access drugs before full approval does not 
require spending common resources on those patients as a result of their 
risky choice. Indeed, the Abigail Alliance litigation, as well as 
congressional and administrative proposals, all contemplate that patients 
will pay for the drugs, most likely out of pocket. Health insurers rarely 
cover experimental treatment, and Medicare may cover patient care costs 
 
 
 280. See generally 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2008) (regulations for ―Protection of Human Subject‖). 
This is the FDA‘s codification of the ―Common Rule.‖ CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS OF 
REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 106–24, 143 (2005). 
 281. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (rejecting individual privilege to 
avoid vaccination because ―the spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire 
population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to remain a part of 
that population‖). 
 282. See supra Part III.B (describing court opinions‘ attempts to frame relevant interest); see also 
Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir. 1989) (―[T]here is no broad legal or constitutional 
‗right to be let alone.‘‖). 
 283. See supra notes 58–65 and accompanying text (describing theory and examples). 
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for clinical trials participants but not access to drugs outside of trials.
284
 
Rather, the ―cost‖ imposed on the public, if access to experimental drugs 
is expanded, is the distortion of clinical trials and the scientific process. In 
that sense, denying access to experimental drugs could fit within the 
conserving common resources rationale. But the commons or public goods 
rationale for the public health right is more defensible than paternalistic, 
social contract, or common resources justifications. The concept of a 
public health right upholds individual choices to expose oneself to risks, as 
long as public goods (or bads) are not implicated. 
Despite baseline deference to individual rights under the public health 
right, the asserted individual right to experimental drugs cannot stand. 
Under this new rubric, the panel‘s self-defense analogy and commentators‘ 
medical self-defense theories fail. Self-defense does not allow a person to 
kill or harm people not threatening her with immediate bodily harm.
285
 
Nor does self-defense allow a person who fears grave injury to strike 
wildly and indiscriminately, taking down anyone in his path who threatens 
possible harm. Accepting the public as the ―body‖ harmed by the Abigail 
Alliance‘s alliance, there is no self-defense claim. That body is not 
threatening the patients with serious bodily injury or death; therefore, there 
is no justification for lashing out at the public anymore than there was 
justification for three starving shipwrecked passengers to kill and eat the 
cabin boy.
286
  
For similar reasons, the therapeutic abortion analogy fails,
287
 unless the 
―fetus‖ is again the body politic that must be sacrificed to save the life of 
the ―mother,‖ the terminally ill patients. Arguably, the claimed right to 
experimental drugs is an even easier case than traditional self-defense or 
therapeutic abortion examples because no other life—merely dangerous 
cancer cells—are being sacrificed to save the individual.288 But others‘ 
 
 
 284. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (discussing insurance and government 
coverage for experimental treatment). 
 285. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Development Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695, 709–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting self-defense analogy because patients were not 
facing threat of harm from anyone); Volokh, supra note 22, at 1821 (acknowledging that self-defense 
―doesn‘t include the right to injure the life, liberty, or property of people who aren‘t the source of the 
threat‖); see also Richard M. Cooper, Response, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 31, 32 (2008) (responding to 
Volokh: ―The ‗right‘ of self-defense is not a claim against anyone else, merely a defense against 
others‘ charges or claims.‖). 
 286. See R v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273. 
 287. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 709 (discussing plaintiffs‘ Roe and abortion analogy); Volokh, 
supra note 22, at 1824–27 (comparing Roe and Casey to Abigail Alliance). 
 288. See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1828 (suggesting that a patient ―should have at least an equal 
right to ingest potentially lifesaving medicines without threatening anyone else‘s life‖). 
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lives, many other lives, are being threatened and sacrificed by allowing 
individuals to exercise the purported right to abort biomedical testing. 
The emphasis on ―lives‖ in this explication of the public health right 
should not be taken to mean that the right turns on a simple utilitarian 
calculus, justifiably invoked only when the number of lives saved by 
prohibiting access to experimental drugs outweighs the number of lives 
saved by expanding access.
289
 To rely on that justification would require 
impossible and unnecessary calculations. Even if those calculations were 
possible with respect to a particular drug, targeted for a particular illness 
(for example, Erbitux for head and neck cancer
290
), the task would be 
made more challenging by the fact that once approved, drugs are often 
prescribed by physicians for other indications.
291
 Moreover, even if the 
numbers of patients benefiting from a drug could be ascertained, the 
speculation on lives saved versus lives lost does not stop there. Drug 
development is a continuous interactive process. A drug that initially 
appears promising for treating one condition may be abandoned before 
clinical trials are completed. But research, even if unsuccessful for that 
study, may hold lessons for future drug development of improved or 
different products.
292
 Those additional lives saved would have to be 
factored into the utilitarian calculus as well. Even more fundamentally, 
lives and life expectancies are not commensurable. Simply comparing 
―lives saved‖ does not lead to sound policy or regulation.293 
 
 
 289. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996) 
(discussing difficulty assessing risks and challenges of comparing lives saved by various, 
uncoordinated regulatory interventions). 
 290. See supra note 157 (describing underlying facts of Abigail Alliance). 
 291. Although drug companies cannot promote approved drugs for off-label uses without FDA 
approval for the new use, the FDA has no authority to regulate the practice of medicine. See Elizabeth 
A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination of Information on Off-Label 
Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
645, 647 (1999) (discussing off-label promotion and prescribing). Section 401 of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act, discussed in that article, was allowed to sunset on September 30, 
2006; the FDA recently proposed new guidance on off-label promotion using peer reviewed articles. 
Draft Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles 
and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and 
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 73 Fed. Reg. 9,342 (Feb. 20, 2008). 
 292. See generally BARRY WERTH, THE BILLION-DOLLAR MOLECULE (1995) (describing saga of 
biotech company start-up, pharmaceutical researcher, and academic rivalry to isolate crucial immune 
system molecule); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION? CHALLENGE 
AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS (2004) (describing strategies 
for increasing new product pharmaceutical product development); Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical 
Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-
Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251 (2008) (identifying incentives for opening research 
community). 
 293. See Sunstein, supra note 289, at 1552 (―We do not reason well if we think that two lives 
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More importantly, recognizing the public health right does not, and 
need not, depend on scientific certainty. As the Court recognized in 
Jacobson, Massachusetts‘s authority to mandate smallpox vaccination did 
not turn on dispositive proof of guaranteed immunizing effect of the 
vaccine.
294
 It was enough for the Court that the legislature had a rational 
basis for its belief in the value of its public health intervention.
295
 Public 
health measures often aim at prevention before harm becomes manifest,
296
 
necessarily involving some degree of risk prediction.
297
 Mandatory 
vaccination is a prime example. The government requires an individual to 
be vaccinated not because that person is actually sick and known to infect 
others. At that point, vaccination would be ineffective, and quarantine 
alone would be the appropriate intervention.
298
 Mandatory vaccination, by 
contrast, aims to prevent individuals from getting sick and infecting the 
rest of the population in the first place. No individual showing of risk is 
required to justify the government‘s intrusion on the right of bodily 
autonomy.
299
  
Risk prediction is inherently imprecise. Government may stop 
activities that turn out to be harmless or allow activities that turn out to be 
 
 
should always be traded for, say, two and a half lives. A great deal depends on the context in which 
those statistical lives are put at risk (and on what those lives would be like).‖). 
 294. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 34–35 (1905) (―While we do not decide and cannot 
decide that vaccination is a preventive of smallpox,‖ the mandatory vaccination law is ―enacted in a 
reasonable and proper exercise of the police power‖). 
 295. Id. (noting near-universal belief of medical profession, legislatures, and the people in value 
of vaccination); see also Indus. Union Dep‘t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 
U.S. 607, 652–55 (1980) (given agency‘s authority to ―promulgate health and safety standards only 
where a significant risk of harm exists, the critical issue becomes how to define and allocate the 
burden of proving the significance of the risk in a case such as this, where scientific knowledge is 
imperfect and the precise quantification of risks is therefore impossible‖; concluding that ―requirement 
that a ‗significant‘ risk be identified is not a mathematical straitjacket‖). 
 296. See Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 656 (describing challenges of risk prediction and giving 
―OSHA some leeway where its findings must be made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge‖); 
Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 31 (describing government interest in addressing potential harms to 
community interests); Cole, supra note 18, at 78 (discussing moral justifications for ―preventive 
intervention‖); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 96 (1851) (broadening police 
power to address not only existing but also prospective harms from private property use, ―making 
them punishable, because they tend to injurious consequences‖) (emphasis added).  
 297. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 3 (1993) (discussing challenges of risk assessment: ―Regulators try to make our lives 
safer by eliminating or reducing our exposure to certain potentially risky substance or even persons 
(unsafe food additives, dangerous chemicals, unqualified doctors).‖). 
 298. See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (accepting challenge to manner, but not 
fact, of quarantined elderly woman infected with leprosy, deemed dangerous and contagious). 
 299. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37–38 (upholding ―system of general vaccination‖ without 
individual exceptions). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
  
 
 
 
 
2009] THE PUBLIC‘S RIGHT TO HEALTH 1391 
 
 
 
 
deadly.
300
 The current law, as affirmed by the Abigail Alliance en banc 
decision, requires new drugs to undergo an extensive, arduous testing 
process before they are marketed to the public, with a few narrow 
exceptions. That seemingly uncompassionate approach may harm some 
terminally ill patients who hold some hope of benefitting from early access 
to experimental drugs outside of clinical trials. Legislative or 
administrative changes may yet change the law and allow expanded access 
in order to alleviate the immediate, present, and highly salient suffering of 
terminally ill patients like Abigail.
301
 That approach may produce 
seemingly abstract, unspecified harm to the public by short-circuiting the 
scientific process. The resulting harm from either approach cannot be 
known with any degree of certainty. ―In public health, the perils of moving 
too rapidly are often as great as those of moving too slowly. There is no 
refuge, either way, from the risks of uncertainty.‖302 The rush to try to save 
lives now should not obscure the potential benefit to the public now and in 
the future. The public health right is not about a special concern for this or 
that individual in particular but concern for all: the public health. The 
current approach to drug approval and testing embodies that concern. 
C. The Public Health Right in Context 
Having identified the public health right and explained its relevance to 
the issue of access to experimental drugs, it is helpful to test the concept in 
other contexts. Full, careful analysis of these examples is left for future 
scholarship, but brief consideration here clarifies the scope of the right and 
returns the reader to the issues raised at the beginning of this Article.
303
 
Does the new ―old‖ public health right support other government 
curtailments of individual rights, such as smoking bans, obesity laws, 
mandatory health insurance, and handgun control? 
Smoking bans are consistent with traditional public health 
interventions, like sanitation and vaccination, and with the public health 
right because smoking in public is a ―public bad.‖ Its effects are imposed 
 
 
 300. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1458–59 (describing public health interventions and risks to 
individual liberties with risk prediction). 
 301. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 5 (2000) (describing ―availability‖ 
heuristic whereby ―[p]eople tend to think that risks are more serious when an incident is immediately 
called to mind or ‗available‘‖); see also BREYER, supra note 297, at 35 (describing judgment errors in 
risk assessment, including ―prominence,‖ meaning that ―[p]eople react more strongly, and give greater 
importance, to events that stand out from the background‖). 
 302. Epstein, supra note 6, at 1465–66. 
 303. See supra notes 11–14 (listing examples). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1392 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1335 
 
 
 
 
broadly on others, without their consent. Smoking bans aim to protect the 
public (i.e., nonsmokers) from the effects of second-hand smoke. Cigarette 
smoke is a tangible, visible externality in the form of puffs of smoke that 
nonsmokers have no choice but to inhale and against which they cannot 
adequately protect themselves. Although nonsmokers may have a choice 
to avoid encountering smoke in private homes or outdoors, it is much 
harder to suggest that they should simply avoid going into indoor public 
spaces if they want to avoid the risks. That the effects of second-hand 
smoke are uncertain and subject to debate does not undermine the public 
health right to restrictions, for the same reasons that perfect risk prediction 
is not required in the experimental drugs context.
304
  
Also, the same practical problems with potential private law solutions 
that arose in the pollution context apply to second-hand smoke. It would 
be nearly impossible to indentify every smoker in whose presence a sick 
individual has breathed, prove those ill health effects were caused by said 
smoker, and collect judgments. Prospective solutions, such as contracts or 
injunctions, would be similarly difficult, in the same terms of identifying 
smokers, negotiating agreements, and enforcing breaches. Therefore, the 
restriction on individual rights in smoking bans seems consistent with the 
public health right. 
As suggested above, obesity laws that aim to reduce availability of 
unhealthy foods in restaurants, schools, and grocery stores seem to intrude 
on individual rights with no countervailing public benefit, in the sense of 
the public health right. Trans fat bans seem justified only on paternalistic 
or ―common resources‖ grounds because they prohibit restaurants from 
selling, and thereby consumers from purchasing, food containing that 
ingredient. Obesity is not a communicable disease and healthy people are 
not exposed to greater risk of obesity if more and more of their neighbors 
―overgraze.‖305 Junk food does have a tendency to make people fat, and 
obesity does tend to cause myriad serious health problems. But for the fact 
that we, as a society, have made a choice to provide medical care for 
people with those health problems, there would be no public harm.
306
 
 
 
 304. See O‘Connor et al., supra note 9, at 403 (citing ―convincing scientific data that laws against 
indoor smoking protect people from the negative health effects of cigarette smoke‖); Damon K. 
Nagami, Note, Enforcement Methods Used in Applying the California Smoke-Free Workplace Act to 
Bars and Taverns, 7 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT‘L L. & POL‘Y 159, 160–61 (2001) (describing reports 
and scientific studies linking second-hand smoke to health problems). 
 305. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1462. 
 306. See Benforado et al., supra note 65, at 1649–51 (describing health effects of obesity and 
costs to the U.S. health-care system as well as lost productivity to businesses). 
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Accordingly, obesity regulation seems outside the scope of the public 
health right. 
Handgun regulation comes closer, however. There are considerable, 
undisputed data on handgun-related deaths and injuries, especially to 
children and adolescents.
307
 In addition, there is good indication that 
restricting access to handguns reduces those numbers.
308
 Although the data 
and correlation between handgun regulation and violence reduction are 
subject to dispute,
309
 the public health right, again, does not depend on 
scientific or mathematical certainty. The devices at issue, quite literally, 
can be characterized as ―public bads,‖ imposing serious and sometimes 
fatal harm on other, nonconsenting members of society. Admittedly, there 
are legitimate private uses of handguns that do not directly impose harm 
on others. Individuals may choose not to own firearms, but the evidence 
suggests this does not effectively insulate them from risk of harm. Thus, 
regulations that restrict and regulate ownership, perhaps just to certain 
persons and places, seem justified in the ―old‖ public health sense.310 
Moreover, private law responses, including victims‘ tort actions, criminal 
prosecution for crimes involving handguns, and products liability litigation 
against gun manufacturers
311
 have proved unsuccessful in reducing 
violence. Without intervention at the collective level, it is hard to envision 
how individuals could secure themselves from handgun violence. 
Therefore, those regulations appear consistent with the public health right. 
The individual health insurance mandate smacks of paternalism
312
 and 
seems hard to justify as a public health right. Sickness and disability cause 
 
 
 307. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2854–61 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing evidence); Brief for the American Public Health Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 3, 21, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290); Brief of the American Academy 
of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290). 
 308. See Drazen et al., supra note 13, at 1 & n.4 (noting 25% decline in firearm-related homicides 
and suicides following 1976 D.C. handgun law and citing study). 
 309. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2854, 2857–58 (noting ―considerable debate about whether the District‘s 
statute helps to achieve that objective‖ of saving lives and describing respondent‘s strong disagreement 
―with the District‘s predictive judgment that a ban on handguns will help solve the crime and accident 
problems that those figures disclose‖). The Court, even in striking down the D.C. restrictions on 
handguns on Second Amendment grounds, acknowledged the ―problem of handgun violence in this 
county and [took] seriously the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of 
handgun ownership is a solution.‖ Id. at 2822. 
 310. In Heller, the Court concluded that ―the District of Columbia‘s‖ restrictions went too far. Id. 
 311. See, e.g., Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 53 P.3d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting wrongful 
death claim against gun manufacturer for murder of child by third party); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) (overturning a jury verdict against multiple firearms 
manufacturers premised on negligent marketing theory). 
 312. See, e.g., Ralston, supra note 14 (―How should we use the force of government to compel our 
fellow citizens to live their lives as the government thinks best?‖). 
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individual suffering that may be alleviated by medical treatment. But 
health care is expensive, and health-care costs can be financially 
devastating to individuals.
313
 Requiring people to purchase health 
insurance may therefore protect them from physical and financial distress. 
But requiring healthy, risk-preferring individuals to purchase health 
insurance intrudes on individual autonomy and property rights. Much like 
sunscreen, one person‘s choice to ―go bare‖ would not seem to restrict 
another‘s choice to be fully covered.  
Mandates might be justified as ―conserving common resources,‖ 
starting from the baseline decision to provide medical care even to the 
uninsured.
314
 Otherwise, the choice to be uninsured does not seem to 
impose any externalities and does not warrant interference. In order to 
cover the cost of uninsured care, health-care providers typically raise 
prices for privately and government-insured patients, effecting informal 
subsidization.
315
 Requiring people to purchase health insurance is 
supposed to shift those costs back on the individuals, rather than 
government and the rest of society.
316
 That argument works only to a 
point, however, because the insurance system itself is designed to pool 
risks, with the ―good risks‖ subsidizing the ―bad risks.‖317 Therefore, the 
 
 
 313. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Individual Health Insurance Mandates and Financial Distress: A 
Few Notes from the Debtor-Creditor Research and Debates, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1247 (2007). 
 314. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395(dd) (2000) (requiring all Medicare-participating hospitals to provide appropriate, 
nondiscriminatory medical screenings to all individuals presenting with emergency medical 
conditions, without regard to ability to pay, insurance status, or Medicare eligibility). EMTALA does 
not impose a broad duty on hospitals to treat beyond the emergency, much less a general duty on other 
providers, including physicians. Public hospitals, community health centers, charitable organizations, 
and government subsidies are some of the many ways that uninsured people receive care. See also 
Epstein, supra note 6, at 1463 (―Indeed today the major argument for extensive regulation of 
individual health practices comes from the government‘s role as the insurer of (first and) last resort‖); 
Stephen J. Ware, “Medical-Related Financial Distress” and Health Care Finance: A Reply to 
Professor Melissa Jacoby, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2007) (suggesting that Jacoby‘s insight 
about shifting the insecurity ―highlights an important truth that is too easily lost in discussions of 
medical care: the cost of providing such care has to be paid by somebody‖). See generally 
ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 136, at 36–37 (Introduction to ―Access to Care‖ chapter, listing 
topics). 
 315. See DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 25 (2000) 
(―The idea that hospitals could raise prices to their privately insured patients to generate the revenues 
necessary to pursue their [nonprofit] mission became known as ‗cost-shifting.‘‖); SHERMAN FOLLAND 
ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 14 (2001) (discussing uncompensated care 
costs and cost-shifting). 
 316. See Whitman, supra note 14 (―the justification of the individual mandate was to reduce cost-
shifting‖ and suggesting ―subsidy to higher risk patients generates a political incentive to regulate 
personal lifestyles‖). 
 317. See generally Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 376–78 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
  
 
 
 
 
2009] THE PUBLIC‘S RIGHT TO HEALTH 1395 
 
 
 
 
individual mandate does not really eliminate the subsidy but merely 
spreads it more broadly.
318
 Moreover, that justification inaccurately 
equates uninsured with indigent. There may be, of course, some uninsured 
patients who simply choose to pay for medical care as they need it, out of 
their own pockets, and do not require subsidization. 
Initial assessment of the individual insurance mandate, therefore, does 
not seem to comport with the public health right. The fact that some 
members of society choose to finance health care through other methods 
(or not at all) exposing themselves to the risk of physical suffering and 
financial catastrophe, does not prevent others from allocating a portion of 
their private resources to purchase health insurance. Moreover, the fact 
that some people are deprived of the choice to purchase health insurance 
because they cannot afford it is not a justification for intervention, in the 
―old‖ sense of the public health right. Addressing socioeconomic 
inequalities and guaranteeing a right to health or access to health care, by 
contrast, are goals of the ―new‖ public health and proponents of the 
individual right to health.
319
 Surely, the challenges of health care and the 
uninsured warrant the public‘s attention and concern. Perhaps other 
rationales for a health insurance mandate can be offered, but the intrusion 
on individual property and liberty rights does not seem to be justified as a 
public health right. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article offers a contemporary examination of traditional public 
health objectives to address social problems not amenable to individual 
resolution. Taking the tradition a step further, it defines a new ―public 
health right‖ that justifies certain government actions that otherwise 
appear to impair individual rights. For example, law and policy makers are 
considering whether current regulations on prescription drugs should be 
loosened to allow terminally ill patients to access the drugs before they 
have been tested and approved for the general public. This Article suggests 
that access to experimental drugs should not be expanded because the 
change would violate the public health right to scientific knowledge and 
new drug development. The ―new‖ public health right is limited along the 
 
 
 318. See Jacoby, supra note 313, at 1250–51 (noting that by ―requiring greater out-of-pocket 
outlays from citizens through the individual mandate . . . Massachusetts does not necessarily make its 
citizens more financially secure; it might just be shifting around the insecurity‖). 
 319. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (discussing individual ―right to health‖ and 
broad goals of ―new‖ public health, including wealth redistribution). 
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same lines as the ―old‖ public health, and supports some, but not all, 
approaches to current social and health problems. This Article‘s 
articulation and defense of a public health right, which may trump even 
strongly protected, assertedly fundamental individual rights, provides a 
rubric for future policy making, in a variety of contexts. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/2
